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Abstract 
This paper utilizes a unique dataset on votes cast by Czech and Polish migrants in their recent 
national elections to investigate the impact of institutional, political and economic characteristics 
on migrants’ voting behavior. The political preferences of migrants are strikingly different from 
those of their domestic counterparts. In addition, there are also important differences among 
migrants living in different countries. This paper examines three alternative hypotheses to 
explain migrant voting behavior: adaptive learning; economic self-selection and political self-
selection. The results of the analysis suggest that migrant voting behavior is affected by the 
institutional environment of the host countries, in particular the tradition of democracy and the 
extent of economic freedom. In contrast, there is little evidence that differences in migrants’ 
political attitudes are caused by self-selection based either on economic motives or political 
attitudes prior to migrating. These results are interpreted as indicating that migrants’ political 
preferences change in the wake of migration as they adapt to the norms and values prevailing in 
their surroundings. 
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1. Introduction 
Social and political assimilation of immigrants is of great interest to political scientists and 
economists alike. Lack of assimilation may engender a segmented and possibly polarized 
society, with immigrant communities espousing political, cultural and religious values that may 
be very different from those prevailing in the host country.
1 Political assimilation, or the lack 
thereof, may also have an important impact on the migrants’ country of origin, especially for 
countries with large diaspora communities. For example, migrant communities of Moslems in 
Europe, which largely succeeded in retaining their religious norms and political attitudes, are 
sometimes seen as providing refuge and breeding grounds for Moslem extremism. This, in turn, 
undermines the stability of their ancestral countries.
2 On the other hand, returning immigrants 
from Western democracies to Central and Eastern Europe played a crucial role in facilitating the 
post-communist countries’ transition from communism to democracy and overcoming the Soviet 
legacy, in regards politics, the economy, education and cultural life.
3 Hence, both the actual 
presence of the diaspora and the political attitudes which they espouse can have important 
bearings on political developments in the ancestral countries.  
The existing literature has identified a number of channels through which the experience of 
migrating and living in a foreign country affects the migrants’ economic and social outcomes. 
Firstly, migrants build up their human capital stock by acquiring new languages and productive 
skills, participating in formal education in the host country, and becoming acquainted with new 
                                                 
1 Huntington (2004) presents a particularly gloomy and controversial assessment of the dangers posed by the 
growing Hispanic community in the US and their lack of assimilation.  
2 This is especially the case in moderately democratic and/or secular countries such as Turkey, Morocco or 
Algeria.  
3 This was particularly pronounced in, though not limited to, the Baltic countries: the current presidents of 
Latvia and Lithuania, Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Valdas Adamkus, respectively, are both former political refugees 
who spent most of their adult lives in emigration and only returned after the Baltic countries seceded from the Soviet 
Union. A naturalized US citizen, Muhamed Sacirbey, played an important role in building support for Bosnia’s 
independence during his term as Bosnia’s ambassador to the UN in early 1990s. In 2000, the then Czech president 
Václav Havel designated Madeleine Albright (who was born in Czechoslovakia as Marie Korbelová) as his 
preferred successor (though the invitation was eventually declined). A somewhat unconventional example of a 
returning émigré is the current prime minister of Bulgaria – the former king Simeon II. In a celebrated example, the 
economic reforms in Chile under Pinochet were conceived and carried out by the “Chicago Boys”: a group of 
Chicago-educated economists. Argentinean reform effort of early 1990s, similarly, was lead by US-educated 
economists: Domingo Cavallo (Harvard) and Roque Fernandez (Chicago). Finally, the diaspora played an important 
role in the recreation and defense of Israeli statehood: a notable example is that of Golda Meir, prime minister 
during the 1967 war, who was a naturalized American citizen.    3
social and cultural norms.
4 Secondly, migrants typically accumulate savings, thus building up 
their stock of physical capital, which can then be used to aid self-employment in the destination 
country or to set up businesses, either themselves or through relatives left behind in the country 
of origin.
5 Finally, migrants also acquire social capital through contacts with the indigenous 
population, in addition to becoming part of a migrant network in the destination country.
6 
This paper considers another potentially important implication of migration that has to date been 
largely unexplored: the impact of migration on the migrants’ political opinions and, especially, 
their voting behavior. Migration often entails moving between two different political systems 
with diverse political standards, norms and traditions, and occasionally, different economic 
systems. Through exposure to local news, culture, formal schooling or through contacts with co-
workers, neighbors and friends, migrants are confronted with fundamental norms and values that 
may be different from, or are even in outright conflict with, those prevailing in their home 
countries. Important examples of such differences include attitudes towards democracy and a 
market-oriented economic system, religious tolerance and secularism, and political attitudes in 
general. The paper at hand studies whether such exposure through migration induces migrants to 
adopt the norms and values prevailing in their destination country. To this end, we utilize an 
original data source which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been previously used in studies 
of voting or migration: votes cast by citizens living abroad who participate in their home 
country’s elections.  
In addition to introducing the political dimension into the study of migration and its implications, 
this paper also sheds new light on one of the most widely raised questions within the voting 
literature: how do voters formulate their political opinions and attitudes? The political 
socialization literature disagrees as to whether one’s political preferences are largely determined 
in young age by family environment and upbringing, or whether they are continuously shaped 
and updated by changes in one’s socio-economic characteristics and/or the social, political and 
institutional environment. Typically, empirical analyses of voting behavior, particularly in 
established democracies, take the external environment as given and stable over time – as 
typically it changes at a very slow rate. Even in countries undergoing radical political and 
                                                 
4 Friedberg (2000), Chiswick and Miller (2004) and Hartog and Winkelmann (2004) analyze migrants’ labor-
market return to skills brought from the home country and adopted in the host country.  
5 See Stark (1991) Chapters 26-28, and Lofstrom (2004).  
6 Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese networks increase bilateral trade flows among South-east 
Asian countries by as much as 60%.   4
economic transformations (such as the Central and East European countries), all voters are 
exposed to essentially the same process of change. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent 
to which one’s external environment, and changes therein, influence voting decisions. This 
restriction, however, does not apply to migrants who are often subject to dramatic changes in 
their external environment. Furthermore, migrants living in different countries become exposed 
to different economic, political and social norms and values. The data used in this paper, 
therefore, are akin to a natural experiment, whereby we observe votes cast by migrants from the 
same country of origin who, at the time of the election in their home country, live in a broad 
variety of host countries. By relating the migrants’ voting behavior to the economic, political and 
institutional characteristics of the destination countries, we can make inferences about the nature 
of interactions between these characteristics and voters’ political preferences. For example, will 
the institutional setting of Canada or Ireland exert the same type of cues as that in Russia or Iran?  
The analysis is based on the most recent parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic (2002) 
and Poland (2001). These countries are particularly suited for this kind of analysis as they are 
currently undergoing transition from communism to democracy and from central planning to a 
market economy, which involves dramatic political, economic and institutional changes. 
Therefore, Czechs and Poles are already likely to be amenable to change, and, additionally, the 
changes they experience in the wake of migration are often substantial (certainly more so than 
the changes experienced by a migrant from a developed country moving to another developed 
country).  
While the numbers of migrant voters are by no means small, their potential impact on political 
developments in their home countries is modest at best. The 3,742 Czechs and 26,211 Poles who 
voted abroad (in 85 and 90 countries, respectively) accounted for only 0.08% and 0.20% of the 
total number of votes in their respective countries. Yet, the most striking characteristic of these 
results from abroad is that they differ dramatically both from the political preferences at home, 
and they vary across the countries and regions where Czech and Polish migrants live. In both 
countries, the national elections resulted in victories by left wing parties, whereas the Czechs and 
Poles living abroad overwhelmingly voted for right wing (and in case of Poland also religious 
conservative) parties. Yet, this difference is driven mainly by votes received from migrants in 
Western Europe, North America and Australia. In contrast, the preferences of Czechs and Poles   5
in the former communist countries, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and, to a 
lesser extent Asia, do not differ overtly from those of the electorate at large.  
This paper considers three alternative explanations for these differences. First, migrants may be 
subject to a selection bias (either due to self-selection or because of the destination countries’ 
immigration policies) whereby those characteristics that determine which country they emigrate 
to are correlated with their political preferences or their economic characteristics. Alternatively, 
through living in a foreign country, migrants’ political attitudes and preferences are shaped by 
the institutional, political and economic environment and the cultural norms prevailing in that 
country. To assess the relative importance of these explanations, the shares of votes cast by 
migrant voters for each home political party are related to variables reflecting the host countries’ 
level of economic development, recent economic performance, political institutions (such as the 
level of political and economic freedom and the nature of the political system in place) and social 
characteristics.  
The following section compares the voting behavior of Czechs and Poles who voted in their 
home countries and those who voted from abroad, and describes the data used in the analysis. 
Section 3 outlines the main theoretical explanations of voting behavior developed in the 
literature, and relates them to theories of migration. Section 4 describes the methodology 
employed and Section 5 presents the results of the analysis. The final section then summarizes 
the main findings. 
2. Migrants’ Voting Behavior  
The legal framework regulating voting by nationals living abroad is similar in both the Czech 
Republic and Poland. Both countries require advance registration and only allow voting in 
person; hence, voting by postal ballot or by proxy is not possible. Those who permanently live 
abroad must register with the embassy or consulate in the country of their permanent residence. 
Those with permanent residence in the home country, on the other hand, can vote when abroad 
upon presenting a voter’s card issued by the municipal council in their district of permanent 
residence.
7 The Czech Republic only allows voting at embassies and consulates. Poland, in 
contrast, also established a number of polling stations in Polish clubs and émigré associations in 
countries with large emigrant populations (for instance, there were eight polling stations in 
                                                 
7 We have no information on the number of votes cast by permanent residents in the host countries and short-
term visitors; hence we cannot distinguish between migrants and tourists.   6
Chicago and four in New York City) and also within a few large overseas installations of Polish 
firms (including, for example, the Polish permanent research station in Antarctica).  
Poland was generally more successful than the Czech Republic in persuading its citizens abroad 
to vote, with voters’ abroad accounting for 0.08% of the electorate in the Czech Republic and 
0.20% in Poland. While this may simply reflect the fact that Poles are more inclined to leave 
their country, it is undoubtedly also due to the greater density of Polish polling stations (both 
because Poland, as a larger country, tends to have multiple consulates in larger countries and 
because voting was also possible at additional polling stations outside of embassies or 
consulates). In addition, Poland adopts a more liberal attitude to dual nationality than the Czech 
Republic, such that Poles who live permanently abroad and have acquired the host country’s 
nationality are often able to remain Polish citizens.  
Overall, 3,742 Czechs and 26,211 Poles cast their votes in 85 and 90 different countries, 
respectively. Tables 1 and 2 report the main election results for both countries. The country with 
the largest number of Czech voters is Slovakia with 374 votes (not surprisingly given the 
common history) followed by the US (285), France (260), Italy (200) and Germany (196). The 
country with the largest number of Polish votes is the US with 7,061 votes, followed by 
Germany (2,872), Canada (1,641) and France (1,406). Quite surprisingly, relatively few votes 
were received from other former socialist countries. Russia, for example, only accounts for 96 
Czech and 606 Polish votes, while 410 Polish votes were received from the Czech Republic and 
70 Czechs voted in Poland.  
2.1 Czech Migrant Voting Behavior 
Table 1 shows the percentages of votes received by the five main political parties in the Czech 
Republic from both home voters and from those living abroad. The most striking difference 
between the two sets of results is in the support for the Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSCM), which received 18.55% of the vote in the Czech Republic and only 2.75% 
from Czech citizens living abroad. The 2002 election saw the KSCM receive its largest share of 
the vote in the post-communist period to date (a gain of 7 percentage points since the 1998 
election), with the majority of its support being derived from mainly rural areas: southern and 
eastern Moravia in particular. While support for the KSCM is far lower among migrant voters 
than among the Czech electorate at large, there is considerable variation across the various   7
migrants’ host countries. The communists fared relatively well in the countries of the former 
Soviet Union where they polled 7.37%, closely followed by 6.90% in Central and East European 
countries and 3.17% in the Middle East and North Africa. In contrast, they did poorly in Asia 
and North America, receiving only 0.53% and 0.54% of the vote, respectively.  
 
Table 1 Czech Election Results 2002 
Political Parties  CSSD 
% 
KSCM 
% 
ODS 
% 
Coalition
% 
ODA 
% 
Others 
% 
No. of 
Votes 
Overall Results
1   30.12 18.55 24.51 14.28  0.51 12.04  4,757,884 
Results from Abroad  25.33  2.75 27.71 33.99  1.71  8.50  3,742 
  Former Soviet Union  37.79  7.37  25.35  17.51  2.30  9.68  217 
  Central and East European  30.28  6.90  28.03  25.35  0.99  8.45  710 
  Western Europe  20.72  1.20  26.95  42.07  1.32  7.75  1,588 
  Asia  19.25  0.53  39.57  24.60  2.67  13.37  187 
  North Africa and Middle-East   44.96  3.17  24.78  15.85  1.15  10.09  347 
  Sub-Sahara Africa  17.89  1.05  35.79  32.63  5.26  7.37  95 
  Australia  8.47  1.69  27.12  54.24  1.69  6.78  59 
  Central and South America  32.74  1.79  23.81  27.98  3.57  10.12  168 
  Northern America  14.29  0.54  28.30  47.17  2.70  7.01  371 
Notes: The party acronyms stand for Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS), Coalition of Christian Democratic Union-Peoples Party of 
Czechoslovakia, Union of Freedom and Democratic Union (Coalition), and 
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA).  
1 Includes votes from abroad.  
Source: Czech Statistical Office.  
 
The domestic and migrant votes for the center-left incumbents, the Czech Social Democratic 
Party (CSSD), do not display as much contrast as those for the KSCM, receiving 30.12% of the 
overall vote and 25.33% of the migrant vote. The CSSD won the 2002 election, however, they 
did lose 2 percentage points and four seats compared to the 1998 election. Similarly to the 
KSCM, the majority of their support comes from rural areas. Again, there is considerable 
variation in support for the CSSD within the votes cast abroad, ranging from 8.47% in Australia 
to 44.96% in North African and Middle Eastern countries. They also derived a large portion of 
votes from other post-communist countries (37.79% in FSU and 30.28% in CEE) and Central 
and South American countries (32.74%).  
The right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS) stands out in that its overall vote share and its 
support among migrant voters are remarkably close. The ODS received 24.51% of the overall   8
vote (down 4 percentage points since 1998 election) and 27.71% of the migrant votes. Overall 
the ODS gained more support from voters in urban areas of the Czech Republic, such as Prague, 
Brno, Plzen and Ostrava, than rural areas. Among migrants, the ODS fared poorly in Central and 
South America (23.81%), North Africa and the Middle East (24.78%) and the former Soviet 
Union (25.35). In contrast, it did well in Sub-Sahara Africa (35.79%) and in Asia (39.57%).  
While support abroad for the two main political parties in the Czech Republic (CSSD and ODS) 
did not display much deviation from the overall votes, support from migrant voters for the 
Coalition party significantly deviates from its support at home. The Coalition was formed in 
February 2000 and originally consisted of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak 
People’s Party (KDU-CSL), Democratic Union (DEU), Freedom Union (US) and Civic 
Democratic Alliance (ODA). However, the “Quad Coalition” collapsed in 2001 and only US-
DEU (which merged into a single party) and KDU-CSL remained. While the Coalition party was 
at one point the most popular party formation in the Czech Republic according to opinion polls, 
they eventually only succeeded in winning 14.28% of the overall vote in the Czech Republic. 
Yet they managed to garner a surprising 33.99% of the migrant votes, and hence effectively 
“won” the election in terms of the abroad votes. The considerable difference in support for the 
Coalition party between Czech’s abroad and the domestic electorate is one of the most 
interesting aspects of this analysis. Support for the Coalition party reaches a high of 54.24% in 
Australia and a low of 17.51% in the FSU countries. The Coalition is the most popular party 
among voters living in Europe (42.07%), Northern America (47.17%) and Australia.  
The Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) was an offspring of the original Civic Forum (along with 
the ODS), and maintained above threshold (5%) support in earlier elections. It then voluntarily 
withdrew from the 1998 election in the wake of a scandal about murky fund-raising and 
allegations of corruption. In the run-up to the 2002 election, the ODA was eventually barred by 
the other three parties from participating in the Quad Coalition after it failed to credibly 
document that its finances were ‘clean’. As Table 1 shows, it only gained 0.51% of the overall 
vote and 1.71% of the abroad vote.  
Finally, the penultimate column shows the percentage of votes received by various small parties
 
that did not pass the 5% threshold for representation. Within the Czech Republic, 12.04% of the 
overall vote went to such small parties, while only 8.50% of votes from abroad went to smaller 
parties. This suggests that Czech migrants were more decisive in their voting decisions and only   9
cast votes for parties which had a high probability of entering parliament. There are two potential 
reasons for this, firstly, Czech’s abroad may only receive information about the larger parties 
and, depending on how long they have been living outside the country, they may not be aware of 
the smaller parties which tend to be more regionally or issue based. Alternatively, the reasoning 
could be based on the paradox of voting hypothesis: given that the cost of voting is higher for 
Czech’s living abroad
8 than for citizens within the country, they will be less inclined to waste 
their vote by voting for parties which are unlikely to enter parliament and hence will only vote 
for the larger parties.  
Overall, the results display a great deal of disagreement between the Czech electorate at large 
and Czech voters living abroad. If Czechs abroad had their say, the government arising from the 
election would most probably be a coalition of right-wing parties rather than a government lead 
by the Social Democrats with the Coalition as their junior partner, as ensued from the total votes. 
However, there is also considerable disagreement among migrant voters living in different 
countries. Czech citizens living in the former communist countries tend to favor left-wing 
parties, with support for the KSCM being highest in the former Soviet Union and support for the 
center-left CSSD reaching its height in Central and East European countries. In contrast, Czech’s 
living in Western democracies tend to support more center-right parties such as the ODS and the 
Coalition party. Those residing in Asian and African countries also display higher levels of 
support for the ODS, while those in Central and South American countries and North African 
and Middle Eastern countries tend to support the CSSD.  
2.2 Polish Migrant Voting Behavior 
Table 2 shows the percentage of votes received by the eight main Polish political parties from 
citizens living abroad and the overall election results of the 2001 election to the Sejm (the lower 
chamber of the Parliament). The September 2001 election was the first parliamentary election to 
take place under the new electoral law introduced in March 2001
9. The election brought about a 
dramatic change in the political make-up of the new parliament, with the two incumbent parties 
(AWSP and UW) even failing to pass the threshold (5% for parties and 8% for coalitions) 
                                                 
8  Czech’s living abroad had to register at the embassy weeks before the election and they had to go to the 
embassy in person to vote. 
9 The new electoral law reduced the number of districts from 52 to 36, abolished the national list and changed 
the allocation method from d’Hondt to Modified Sainte-Langue, hence increasing the proportionality of the elections 
results and reducing the share of the largest party. For a more detailed account please see Benoit and Hayden (2002).    10
required for representation in the parliament. The preferences of Poles abroad also differ notably 
from the sentiments of their domestic counterparts, although perhaps not as dramatically as in the 
Czech case. The main divergences occurs, on the one hand, with respect to the winner of the 
election, the Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union (SLD-UP) and, on the other hand, in regard
to the various fringe parties.   11
 
 
Table 2 Polish Parliamentary Election Results 2001 
Political Parties  SLD-UP  
% 
AWSP 
% 
UW  
% 
SO  
% 
PiS  
% 
PSL  
% 
PO  
% 
LPR  
% 
Others 
% 
Total 
Votes 
Overall Results
1  41.04 5.60  3.10 10.20 9.50  8.98 12.68 7.87  1.02  13,017,929
Results from Abroad  25.98 7.37 10.02 1.37 19.04 1.90 15.88  17.84 0.60  26,200 
  Former Soviet Union  44.55  7.30  8.83  0.84  11.06  2.84  13.29  10.83  0.46  1,302 
  Central and East Europe  44.49  5.28  10.02  1.58  11.02  2.54  18.21  5.86  1.00  2,405 
    Western  Europe  25.65 9.54 12.88 1.45 17.55 1.55 18.28  12.66 0.45  10,651 
    Asia  43.56 5.81 19.96 0.18  7.99  1.63 18.87 1.63  0.36  551 
  North Africa / Middle-East  48.93  1.98  12.69  2.39  8.81  2.55  17.87  3.46  1.32  1,214 
  Sub-Sahara Africa  29.37  12.21  19.80  1.65  8.91  3.63  19.80  3.30  1.32  303 
  Australia  27.15  10.60  10.60  1.55  27.15  0.44  11.26  11.04  0.22  453 
  Central/South America  26.33  11.47  16.32  1.29  10.18  3.55  22.46  5.65  2.75  619 
  Northern America  13.97  5.53  4.87  1.22  26.96  1.83  11.85  33.31  0.46  8,702 
Notes: The party acronyms stand for Coalition of Democratic Left and Union of Labor (SLD-UP), Solidarity Electoral Action (AWSP), Union of Freedom 
(UW), Self defense of the Polish Republic (SO), Law and Justice (PiS), Polish People's Party (PSL), Citizens' Platform (PO), and League of Polish Families 
(LPR). 
1 Includes votes from abroad. 
Source: Polish Central Electoral Commission.  
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The Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union (SLD-UP) received 41.04% of the overall vote in 
Poland, while only securing 25.98% of the vote from Poles living abroad. The Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) has its roots in the original Polish Communist Party, however, unlike the Czech 
KSCM, it has largely succeeded in shedding its communist heritage and transformed into a 
Western European style socialist party. Due to this successful transformation, the left-wing but 
anti-Communist Labor Union (UP) was willing to form an alliance with SLD for the 2001 
election, with the objective of forming a modern social-democratic coalition. This election saw 
the SLD-UP receive its largest share of the vote in the post-communist era, gaining 14 
percentage points over the 1997 election. However its support varied considerably among 
migrant Poles, reaching a high of 48.93% from Poles living in North Africa and the Middle-East, 
closely followed by the Former Soviet Union (44.55%), Central and Eastern Europe (44.49%) 
and Asia (43.56%). Unsurprisingly, they derived least support in North America (13.97%). Yet, 
despite these differences, the SLD-UP ended up being the most popular party in every region 
apart from North America, hence following the trend of the overall election results. Another 
party with roots in the communist era is the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL), which won 8.98% of 
the national vote yet only received 1.90% of the migrant vote. PSL is largely a rural based party 
which may explain its lack of support among Poles living abroad.  
One of the most interesting outcomes of the 2001 election was the collapse in support for the two 
incumbent parties – the conservative Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (AWSP) and the 
liberal Freedom Union (UW) – who saw their vote shares plummet from 33.80% to 5.60% and 
from 13.40% to 3.10%, respectively, since the 1997 election. Both parties thus failed to enter the 
parliament as they did not clear the electoral threshold of 5% for parties and 8% for coalitions 
(the AWSP is a coalition of a number of conservative and Christian democratic parties). Among 
the migrant Poles, the AWSP received 7.37% of the vote and the UW garnered 10.02%. There is 
considerable variation in support for the AWSP from those living abroad, with their support 
reaching a high in Sub-Sahara Africa (12.21%) and Central and South America (11.47%) and a 
low in North Africa and the Middle East (1.98%) and Central and Eastern Europe (5.28%). 
Hence, they consistently failed to reach their former level of support in any region. On the other 
hand, while UW also lost a considerable amount of support among domestic voters, they 
remained popular among Poles abroad, receiving 10.02% of the overall migrant vote, reaching a   13
high of 19.66% in Asia, closely followed by 19.80% in Sub-Sahara Africa, while faring poorly 
with a mere 4.87% in North America.  
The 2001 election also saw four new political parties enter the Polish parliament. The most 
successful of these was Citizens’ Platform (PO), which gained a substantial share of both the 
domestic (12.68%) and the migrant (15.88%) vote. This liberal party, which was formed in 2001, 
received considerable support among Poles voting from Central and South America (22.46%), 
while only receiving 11.85% of the vote from migrants in North America.  
The second most favored party among Poles living abroad is the Law and Justice Party (PiS) 
which received 19.04% of the migrant vote, while only receiving 9.50% of the overall domestic 
vote. PiS is a right-wing anti-corruption party which was also formed in 2001. It proved to be 
popular among Poles living in Australia (27.15%), North America (26.96%) and Western Europe 
(17.55%), while faring badly in Asia (7.99%), North Africa and the Middle East (8.81%) and 
Sub-Sahara Africa (8.91%). 
The final two additions to the Polish political scene are both radical parties. Self Defence of the 
Polish Republic (SO) is a radical farmers’ movement, which derives its support from those 
discontented with the political and economic changes that occurred since 1989. As with the PSL, 
its mainly rural following explains the lack of support from Poles living abroad (1.37%) 
compared to its domestic support (10.2%). Indeed, SO failed to receive more than 2.39% from 
any region in which migrant Poles are living. Finally, the League of Polish Families (LPR) is a 
nationalist-Christian based far-right party, which is among the most vocal opponents of Poland’s 
entry into the EU. Interestingly, while it only received 7.87% of the overall domestic vote, it 
received 17.84% of the vote from migrant Poles. Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of this 
support abroad comes from voters living in North America (33.31%), followed by Western 
Europe (12.66%) whereas it fared relatively poorly in Asia (1.63%), Sub-Sahara Africa (3.3%) 
and North Africa and the Middle East (3.46%).  
The 2001 Polish election originally resulted in a coalition of SLD-UP and PSL (although 
subsequently the PSL withdrew from that coalition, leaving the SLD-UP with a slim 
parliamentary majority). However, had the migrant votes been the deciding factor, this coalition 
would not have been viable and a coalition of the PO, PiS and UW, would have been more   14
likely.
10 Overall, while the divergence between the domestic votes and migrant votes is not as 
great as in the Czech case, there is still a marked difference in the political preferences of Poles 
living at home and those living abroad.  
 
3. Theories of Voting, Political Socialization, and Migration 
The economic theory of voting builds on the seminal contribution of Downs (1957) who applied 
rational choice theory to voting behavior. Downs posited that individuals vote in order to 
maximize their expected utility, given the information available to them at the time of the 
election. A number of factors can enter the voters’ utility function (and these factors may enter 
with different weights across voters and/or across time). Nannestad and Paldam (1994) 
differentiate between the economic and political components of the voters’ utility function. The 
economic component stands for indicators of voters’ material well being associated with voting 
for a particular party (the literature further distinguishes between egocentric and sociotropic 
voters, the former are primarily concerned with their own individual well being while the latter 
put greater weight on aggregate economic outcomes). Rational voters will support parties that 
they expect to implement policies that are favorable to them and will increase their overall 
welfare. The political component corresponds to the utility which the voters derive from 
ideology, religion, patriotism and nationalism, racial, ethnic or linguistic identification, etc. All 
else being equal, one will prefer a party that stands for similar values as their own. Finally, voters 
can also behave strategically, such that voting for a specific party will have greater bearing on 
the voter’s utility if that party eventually participates in the government or is included in the 
legislature. Therefore, voters may shy away from voting for fringe parties and may instead 
support their second-best choice, which is more likely to receive enough votes from other voters. 
Alternatively, voters can use their votes to send a signal to the future government, as argued by 
Piketty (2000) and Castanheira (2003). Accordingly, by voting for extremist parties, the voters 
may induce the mainstream parties to shift their post-election policies closer to those of the 
extremists.  
In a stylized way, the expected utility of voter i derived from voting for party j can be expressed 
as follows:  
                                                 
10 These three parties in fact jointly fielded candidates in the election to the Senate, the upper chamber of the 
Polish Parliament.   15
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In this expression, the first term represents the economic component of the voter’s utility 
function while the second term stands for the political consideration, with  λi determining their 
relative weights (although  λi may vary over time, time subscripts have been omitted for 
simplicity). The economic component primarily measures the future consumption opportunities 
(with consumption defined broadly) that result from party j’s actions while in government or in 
the legislature. The political term measures the distance between the voter’s ideological position, 
xi, and that of the party in question, with the voter’s utility falling as the distance increases. The 
last term, εi, collects all the remaining aspects of the voting decision, such as random swings in 
political attitudes but also potential strategic considerations.  
Both the economic and political terms of the voter’s utility function may change over time. A 
voter’s political and ideological attitudes are likely to change when her socio-economic 
characteristics have changed (for example, imagine two workers within a now bankrupt firm, of 
whom one became a successful entrepreneur whereas the other remained unemployed). Finally, 
attitudes may also respond to changes in the political and institutional environment. While 
political systems and institutions in most countries are generally very slow to change, the 
changes experienced by migrant voters are often dramatic. Moreover, migrants moving to 
different countries are exposed to different institutions and political systems. Therefore, by 
relating migrants’ votes to political and institutional variables in the destination countries, we can 
learn how the external environment affects political attitudes and voting behavior specifically.
11 
While several studies have analyzed the voting behavior of migrant communities in the national 
elections of their new country of residence
12, to the best of our knowledge, none to date have 
examined the impact of a new political, social and cultural environment on the voting behavior 
of migrants participating in elections in their country of origin. As already stated, empirical 
                                                 
11 As migrant voters, by definition, live outside the jurisdiction of their national government, the economic 
environment in the country that they live in is less likely to have much bearing on their voting behavior. Of course, 
migrant voters’ decisions may be affected also by economic considerations, either out of concern for friends and 
family in the home country of because they expect to return in the future. In that case, however, their voting 
behavior is likely to be shaped by economic developments back home rather than those in the country where they 
currently live. Yet, we might find a significant effect if, for instance, migrants in high-inflation countries perceive 
anti-inflationary policies as important also for their home country, and accordingly vote for parties that they expect 
to be tough on inflation.  
12 Black et al. (1987); Cho (1999); Correa (1998); Finifter and Finifter (1989); Garcia (1987); Gitelman (1982); 
Glaser and Gilens (1997); Wong (2000).    16
analyses of voting have to take the external environment as given and stable over time. 
Therefore, by analyzing the voting behavior of migrant populations in a large number of diverse 
countries, we can infer to what extent the external environment matters in the formation of a 
person’s core political values, beliefs and subsequent behavior, a process referred to in the 
literature as political socialization.  
While the literature on the formation of political attitudes is vast, the two main conflicting 
theories in the field are the Social Psychological model and the Rational Choice model. The 
social psychological theorists (Campbell et al., 1960) tend to emphasize the importance of 
parental socialization and downplay the role of short-term influences, while the rational choice 
theorists (Downs, 1957) stress the continuous incorporation of new information into the 
cumulative evaluations of various parties. Political resocialization therefore can be defined more 
in terms of the rational choice hypothesis, whereby the migrants incorporate information about 
their new political environment into their decision sets. The influence of such new information, 
however, may be dependent on the extent to which the migrant is immersed in the host country’s 
cultural, political and social life. Brown (1988), in an examination of voting behavior among 
those who move across states in the US, found that if the new political environment differs from 
the old political environment, then both voting behavior and party identification tend to become 
similar to those in the new state. However, research by Black et al. (1987), which examined the 
political adaptation of immigrants to Canada, found that the country of origin was not a strong 
influence on post-migration political adaptation. Finifter and Finifter (1989) find that both past 
party identification and political ideology influence the political adaptation of American 
emigrants in Australia. They conclude that new political learning is dependent upon both 
previous ideological views and the new political environment. However, these studies are based 
on emigrants attitudes towards the new political system in which they are living, as such, these 
emigrants may be more influenced by their new environment as they can actively participate in it 
i.e., they can vote in the national elections and thus will be more susceptible to absorbing the 
social norms/ideologies of the new political environment.  
This analysis, however, examines the extent to which the migrants’ new environment will 
influence their voting behavior in elections in their country of origin. Therefore the effect of their 
new external environment may be less influential than in these previous studies. Nannestad, 
Paldam and Rosholm, (2003) examine the speed at which immigrants converge to native voters   17
in their evaluations of the economic competence of the government, using pre-election poll data 
for both native Israelis and immigrants from the former communist countries who are now living 
in Israel. They find very little difference between the two groups, hence suggesting that 
immigrants quickly adopt the economic evaluation patterns of the natives. While this case differs 
somewhat from our study, it does suggest that migrants are influenced by their new environment 
and can readily learn and assess new economic systems with relative accuracy.  
A key issue in this respect is whether migrant voters adopt the norms and values prevailing in the 
host country or whether the choice of the destination country is in fact affected by the migrant’s 
original political attitudes. Clearly, correlation between institutional and political variables and 
voting behavior is not indicative of causality going in either direction. Migrants are likely to have 
different socio-economic characteristics than the stayers (as is evident from the fact that typically 
only a small fraction of a country’s population leaves). For instance, migrants may be more 
entrepreneurial and respond more readily to economic opportunities. In this respect, theories of 
migration can help us understand what determines the choice of destination. Building on Todaro 
(1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970), the migration literature assumes that migrants are attracted 
by higher expected earnings in the host country. This line of reasoning, however, cannot explain 
why certain types of migrants are more likely to go to specific countries than other migrants. 
Borjas (1987 and 1991, building on Roy, 1951) argues that migration decisions also depend on 
the dispersion of earnings in the alternative destinations. Highly productive workers will move to 
countries with widely dispersed earnings, as that is where their skills will yield the highest 
return. In contrast, unproductive workers are more likely to choose destinations with highly 
equal distribution of earnings, as in these countries their low productivity will be penalized less. 
Accordingly, highly productive and entrepreneurial individuals – who tend to form the natural 
constituency of right wing parties – would gain from moving to countries such as the US but also 
post-communist and developing countries with high levels of wage inequality (e.g. Russia or 
Brazil). On the other hand, blue-collar and less productive white-collar workers would gain more 
from moving to highly egalitarian countries such as continental Western Europe.  
Another source of self-selection of migrants involves political motivations. Dissenters and 
political refugees accounted for a considerable part of emigration from the Czech Republic and 
Poland during the communist period. Thus, those who moved to communist countries at that 
time are likely to be more left leaning, while those who moved out of the Soviet Block were   18
more likely to be right leaning. There seems, however, little reason for political factors to weigh 
heavily in migration decisions after 1990 – as political repressions ceased in both countries when 
the communist regimes collapsed in nearly all countries of the former Soviet Block. Therefore, 
inasmuch as the pre-1990 emigrants remained abroad and retained their original nationality, one 
can expect more left-wing (and in particular pro-communist) voters in other post-communist 
countries and more right-wing (and possibly also social democratic) voters in Western countries. 
The distribution of post-1990 emigrants, however, is different – left-wing sympathizers are more 
likely to move to relatively egalitarian Western countries, while right-wing individuals should be 
more prone to migrate to developing and other post-communist countries, in line with the Roy-
Borjas theory.  
 
4. Methodology 
The principal variable of interest in this analysis is the proportion of votes, Vij, that party j 
receives from voters living in country i. Therefore, the data display two specific properties that 
need to be taken into account in the analysis: the individual observations lie between 0 and 1, and 
the proportion of votes received by all parties sum to one.  
The majority of voting studies to date have been estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
13 
Yet, as argued by Jackson (2001) and Tomz et al. (2002), OLS is inappropriate for analyses of 
elections in multiparty systems as it does not satisfy either of the above conditions. In particular, 
in situations when small parties take part in elections, OLS can result in predicted vote shares 
that are negative. Therefore, in order to avoid this, we transformed the vote shares, Vij, into the 
following logit form:  
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
− ij
ij
V
V
1
log  
The resulting dependent variable is unbounded (i.e. it takes values between −∞ and ∞) but is not 
defined for vote shares of either 0 or 1. As there are several zero observations in the data, 
especially for the communist party, we added 0.001 to all vote shares before performing the logit 
transformation.  
                                                 
13 Tomz et al. (2002) report that out of nineteen articles analysing multiparty election data published in leading 
political science journal between 1996-2000, eighteen use OLS.   19
All regressions are estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model, which 
takes account of the adding-up constraint characteristic of election data. SUR is a special case of 
generalized least squares, which estimates a set of equations with cross-equation constraints 
imposed, specifically, it allows for the possibility that the residuals are correlated across parties. 
Therefore, if one party has a large positive residual, the others will have small and some negative 
residuals for that observation. Estimating a set of seemingly unrelated regressions jointly as a 
system yields more efficient estimates than estimating them separately, especially as the 
correlation among the errors rises and the correlation among the independent variables falls 
(Greene, 2000). SUR is also particularly efficient when the independent variables differ from one 
equation to the next. Overall SUR is at a minimum more convenient and no less efficient than 
estimating individual OLS equations for each party (Tomz et al., 2002). 
The analysis utilizes information on votes cast by Czech and Polish migrants in 85 and 90 
countries, respectively. Countries in which less than 10 migrants voted were omitted from the 
analysis due to the small sample size representing those particular countries (this issue only arose 
in the Czech data where 19 countries had to be dropped; whereas all countries in the Polish data 
set had more than 10 votes). Furthermore, analytic weights are applied in all regressions to 
account for the differing number of migrant voters in each country. Analytic weights are the 
most appropriate weights to use given the dependent variable in the analysis is the average of all 
votes cast by migrants in a particular country, therefore weighting by the number of voters in 
each country takes account for the fact, for example, that there were 260 votes cast by Czech 
citizens in France and only 11 votes cast in Costa Rica.  
As there are no preceding theories to prescribe which factors may influence migrant voting 
behavior, the analysis follows a somewhat agnostic approach: we relate migrant votes to a wide 
array of explanatory variables selected so as to account for three alternative hypotheses of 
migrant voting behavior:  
Skill-based economic self-selection (Roy-Borjas model of migration): Accordingly, highly skilled 
and educated potential migrants are more likely to migrate to countries with a high degree of 
income inequality. Given that highly skilled, highly educated and entrepreneurial individuals 
tend to vote right-wing parties, income inequality should therefore be positively correlated with 
support for right-wing parties and negatively correlated with support for left-wing and former 
communist parties.    20
Political self-selection: Migrants located in former socialist countries should display greater 
support for left-wing and especially former communist parties than those in Western 
democracies, and vice versa for right-wing parties.  
Adaptive learning: Migrants adapt to the norms and values prevailing in the host country. 
According to this hypothesis, higher support for democratic and liberal parties and lower support 
for former communist parties should be observed in countries with a long tradition of democracy 
and a market economy. Similarly, the voting preferences of migrants may be correlated with the 
prevailing political attitudes (captured by the political orientation of the government) and/or 
economic conditions in the host country.  
To test the adaptive learning hypothesis, we include a number of institutional, political and 
socio-economic indicators pertaining to the host countries. These include firstly, various 
measures of democracy
14: indexes of civil liberties and political freedom (compiled and reported 
by the Freedom House); fraction of years between 1972 and 2001 in which the country was 
classified by the Freedom House as either free, partially free or not free. Secondly, measures of 
economic freedom
15 (reported by the Frasier Institute) as captured by the following sub-
indexes
16: size of government, legal structure and security of property rights, sound money, 
foreign trade liberalization, and regulation. Thirdly, various measures of economic development, 
such as GDP per capita (as of 2000 in thousands US dollars), the economic growth rate and 
inflation in 2000. Finally, they include measures of the political environment as captured by an 
indicator of the political orientation of the government (left wing, centrist/mixed, right wing, 
autocratic or ethnically/religiously dominated); and the nature of the political system (strong or 
weak presidential or parliamentary).
17 Next, the Gini index is included to account for the skill-
based economic self-selection hypothesis in line with the Roy-Borjas model. Finally, the political 
self-selection hypothesis, which stresses the impact of current or past political ties and their 
                                                 
14 Two alternative democracy measures were initially used: the Freedom House Democracy Index and the 
Polity Democracy Index. As the correlation between the 2 indexes (for 2001) is a very high 0.92, we use the 
Freedom House Index due to greater country coverage. 
15 Two alternative measures of economic freedom were also originally used: the Heritage economic Freedom 
Index and the Fraser Economic Freedom Index. The correlation between the 2 indexes is a high 0.91, and therefore 
we use the Fraser Index which has greater country coverage. 
16  See Appendix for bivariate correlations of the various sub-indexes. 
17 Data definitions and sources are discussed in greater detail in the Appendix.    21
legacies, is accounted for by including a number of regional dummy variables in all the 
regressions.
18  
There is a non-negligible degree of correlation between some variables (for example, developed 
countries tend to display relatively high degrees of both economic freedom and democracy). 
Therefore, the coefficient estimates may change substantially depending on the other variables 
included in the model. In addition, given we have only limited a priori expectations about which 
particular host country characteristics may influence migrant voting behavior, we apply a 
general-to-specific procedure (for an explanation and assessment of this methodology, see 
Hoover and Perez, 1999, and the references therein) to determine which factors are robust. This 
procedure starts off with a general unrestricted regression specification, including all possible 
explanatory variables, which is then tested against more parsimonious models (nested within the 
general model), repeating the testing-down procedure until no further variables can be excluded. 
The result is a model that is less complex than the general model but nonetheless contains all the 
relevant information. Although this procedure is sometimes likened to sophisticated data mining, 
Hoover and Perez (1999) show that in most cases (on average 80%), the general-to-specific 
procedure succeeds in identifying the true data-generating model or a closely related model (i.e. 
one that encompasses the true model but contains additional irrelevant variables that the 
procedure fails to eliminate). We implemented the procedure manually, using STATA, repeating 
the step-wise testing down procedure until the exclusion tests became significant at least at the 
10% level (we choose this moderate threshold in view of the relatively low number of 
observations). At each step, the least significant variable for each party was tested and 
eliminated, taking care to test for variables at similar levels of significance (as a general rule, 
only variables whose significance was no more than 30 percentage points off the least significant 
one were included at each step, i.e. if the lowest significance level was 50%, variables that 
appeared with up to 20% significance level were included in the exclusion test).  
 
                                                 
18Both a distance variable (distance from capital to capital as measured by 
www.geobytes.com/CityDistancetool.htm.) and border dummies were also included, however they are only 
significant when the regional variables are not included. As a migrant in the US, for example, may be able to sustain 
a closer relationship with his Polish roots than, for example, one in Romania, due to the larger Polish immigrant 
community in the former and easier access to information.    22
5. Determinants of Migrant Voting Behavior 
This section reports the results of the empirical analysis of migrant votes in the last Czech and 
Polish parliamentary elections. As discussed above, in the absence of a theory of migrant voting 
behavior and in view of the large number of potentially relevant variables, the analysis is carried 
out using the general-to-specific procedure, starting with the most general unrestricted model, 
which is gradually slimmed down until all insignificant variables are dropped (with the 
significance threshold set at the 10 % level). The analysis is performed using two alternative 
indexes of democracy (both compiled by the Freedom House). The indexes measure two 
different aspects of democracy: civil liberties (freedom of expression and association, religious 
and educational freedom) and political rights (universal franchise, organization of free elections 
with participation open to all groups within society). The two indexes are very closely correlated 
(the correlation coefficient across the countries in our sample is 0.94). Therefore, to avoid 
multicollinearity, we estimate two models for each country, one including the civil liberties 
index and one with the political rights index, rather than including both indexes in parallel as we 
do with the remaining variables.  
As discussed above, the migrant votes are regressed on a number of host country institutional, 
political and economic characteristics, a measure of income inequality, and a number of regional 
dummies (with Western Europe being the omitted category), so as to control for the three 
alternative hypotheses of migrant voting behavior. In addition, two country specific dummies 
were also included. First, the votes from Italy include also those from the Czech and Polish 
consulates in the Vatican, a large fraction of which was probably cast by clergymen and theology 
students. Therefore, as their political attitudes may be significantly different from the rest of the 
electorate, especially with respect to support for Christian-democratic parties, a dummy for Italy 
was included. Second, the US has a large number of Polish immigrants, who are often allowed to 
retain their Polish nationality after acquiring US citizenship. This potentially makes the 
American-Polish immigrant community different from Polish migrants in other countries (where 
typically they would have to give up their Polish nationality in order to become naturalized 
citizens of the host country – and thus would not be eligible to vote in Polish elections): the 
former have lived in the host country much longer (or may even have been born there) and 
therefore probably keep much looser contacts with the ancestral country. Furthermore, being a 
relatively large and geographically concentrated community, American Poles are more likely to   23
retain their own unique identity (which may also be markedly different from that in present-day 
Poland) than migrants living in other countries where they are less numerous and more 
dispersed. Although the Czech migrant population in the US appears neither particularly large 
nor geographically concentrated, for the sake of comparability we also included the US dummy 
in the Czech regressions.  
The results obtained for the general unrestricted models are reported in Appendix A. Tables 3 
and 4 then present the final results for those explanatory variables that survived the elimination 
by the general-to-specific procedure. We analyze the votes cast for five Czech and seven Polish 
political parties; the results for each party are reported in separate tables labeled A-E in the 
Czech regressions and A-G in the Polish regressions. Not surprisingly, given the large number of 
explanatory variables and the low number of observations, not many variables appear significant 
in the general unrestricted models. Applying the general-to-specific methodology, however, 
greatly reduces the number of explanatory variables. Out of a total of 130 explanatory variables 
in the Czech regressions, 78 and 74 are eliminated as insignificant in the regression with civil 
liberties and political rights, respectively. For Poland, the ‘drop-out’ rate is even higher: 147 and 
130 variables out of a total of 196.  
 
Table 3 Czech Republic: General-to-Specific Results 
A. Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.114*** (0.037) 0.443*** (0.114) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared      -0.043***  (0.010) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.136*** (0.037) -0.099*** (0.038) 
EF: Regulation      0.180***  (0.063) 
Inflation [%]      -0.020**  (0.008) 
Gov.: authoritarian  0.774**  (0.322)     
Parliamentary 0.255**  (0.105)  0.374***  (0.109) 
Central/Eastern Europe  -0.423***  (0.146)     
South East Asia  0.680***  (0.230)     
Central/Latin America      -0.445**  (0.211) 
Italy -0.609***  (0.192)  -0.476**  (0.206) 
Constant  -0.883*** (0.249) -1.651*** (0.428) 
R-squared 0.400  0.410 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of 
government, Legal/property rights, Foreign trade; GDP per capita, GDP growth, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing and 
Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong 
presidential omitted); Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Anglo-Saxon, United States (Europe 
omitted).  
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B. Czech Social Democratic   
Party (CSSD) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  0.470**  (0.213)  0.275***  (0.080) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.045***  (0.014)     
Fraction  Years  Free  -1.417**  (0.693) -2.080*** (0.805) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  -1.639*** (0.591) -2.532*** (0.622) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.444***  (0.133)     
EF: Sound Money      0.181*  (0.102) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.369*** (0.117) -0.293*** (0.115) 
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)  -0.058***  (0.021)  -0.046***  (0.016) 
Inflation  [%]  0.028***  (0.011) 0.036** (0.015) 
Gov.: Left wing  -0.375*  (0.198)     
Gov.:  authoritarian  2.050*** (0.556) 2.376*** (0.534) 
Parliamentary  -0.507***  (0.202) -0.298* (0.170) 
Central/Eastern Europe  -1.089*** (0.412) -1.315*** (0.433) 
Former Soviet Union  -1.942***  (0.630)     
South East Asia  -0.902***  (0.363)     
Middle East/North Africa  -2.592***  (0.654)  -1.184**  (0.533) 
Italy  -1.031*** (0.344) -1.117*** (0.334) 
Constant  0.130 (0.908) -0.357 (0.844) 
R-squared 0.529  0.515 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years not free (omitted); Size of government, Foreign trade; GDP growth, 
Centrist/mixed, and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral 
system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Latin America (Europe omitted).  
 
C. Communist Party of Bohemia  
and Moravia (KSCM) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  1.698***  (0.450)     
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.137***  (0.036)  0.026***  (0.010) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -5.057*** (1.079) -3.350*** (1.144) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  -5.468*** (1.153) -3.442*** (1.092) 
EF: Size of Government  0.242**  (0.128)     
EF: Legal/Property Rights  1.022***  (0.250)  1.013***  (0.288) 
EF: Foreign Trade  0.477**  (0.262)  0.710***  (0.271) 
EF: Regulation  -0.999***  (0.313)  -0.752**  (0.269) 
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)      -0.116***  (0.055) 
Inflation [%]      0.054**  (0.023) 
Parliamentary  -1.623*** (0.420) -2.031*** (0.458) 
Italy -2.260***  (0.795)  -1.590**  (0.794) 
Constant  -9.762*** (2.285) -9.224*** (2.405) 
R-squared 0.526  0.544 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years not free (omitted); Sound Money; GDP growth, Centrist/mixed, 
Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential 
electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, South-east Asia, 
Middle East and North Africa, Central/Latin America, Anglo-Saxon, United States (Europe omitted).    25
 
D. Coalition (KDU-US)  Civil Liberties Political  Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom      -0.142**  (0.062) 
Fraction Years Free      1.447**  (0.662) 
Fraction Years Partially Free    0.917*  (0.499) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  -0.350*** (0.098) -0.275*** (0.089) 
EF:  Regulation  0.590*** (0.096) 0.501*** (0.107) 
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)  0.077***  (0.017)  0.057***  (0.016) 
Gov.: Left wing  0.349**  (0.162)  0.253*  (0.132) 
Parliamentary  0.428*** (0.147) 0.363*** (0.142) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.516*** (0.169) 1.057*** (0.340) 
South East Asia      -0.389*  (0.234) 
Middle East/North Africa      -0.630**  (0.318) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.365**  (0.150) -0.289* (0.154) 
Italy  1.558*** (0.261) 1.464*** (0.253) 
Constant  -3.800*** (0.526) -3.263*** (0.560) 
R-squared 0.763  0.794 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/Political Freedom Squared; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction 
years not free omitted); Size of government, Sound money, and Foreign trade; GDP growth, Inflation, 
Centrist/mixed, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential 
electoral system (Strong presidential omitted); Former Soviet Union, Central/Latin America (Europe omitted).    26
 
E. Others  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  0.225***  (0.068)     
Civil/Political Freedom Squared      0.014**  (0.007) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -0.926**  (0.428) -2.680*** (0.642) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights      0.380***  (0.098) 
EF: Sound Money  -0.234**  (0.107)  -0.384***  (0.120) 
EF: Foreign Trade      -0.205*  (0.114) 
EF:  Regulation  0.374***  (0.111) 0.264** (0.137) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.067*** (0.016) -0.070*** (0.017) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -0.570*** (0.153) -0.573*** (0.174) 
Gov.: Left wing
1     -0.490**  (0.208) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -2.007*** (0.665) -1.960*** (0.664) 
Central/Eastern Europe      -1.462***  (0.404) 
Former Soviet Union  1.956***  (0.612)     
South East Asia  0.904**  (0.379)     
Middle  East/North  Africa  3.680*** (0.711) 1.746*** (0.647) 
Anglo-Saxon     -0.614***  (0.235) 
United States  -0.707**  (0.290)     
Constant  -3.494***  (0.819) -0.360 (1.054) 
R-squared 0.471  0.472 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government; 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential 
and Parliamentary electoral system (Strong presidential omitted); Central/Latin America, and Italy (Europe omitted).  
Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
χ
2(10) = 36.30***  χ
2(10) = 36.98*** 
Notes: Number of observations is 54. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are applied using the 
total number of votes per country. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy also include those from the 
Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breush-Pagan test of 
independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the equations 
in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR 
is justified. 
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Table 4 Poland: General-to-Specific Results 
A. Coalition of Democratic Left 
and Union of Labor (SLD-UP) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.005***  (0.002)     
EF: Legal/Property Rights      -0.112***  (0.033) 
EF: Foreign Trade      0.178***  (0.047) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.296*** (0.055) -0.421*** (0.039) 
Gini Index      0.014**  (0.006) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed  0.296***  (0.077)  0.383***  (0.076) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious  0.401**  (0.185)  0.613***  (0.214) 
Parliamentary 0.313***  (0.081)     
Former Soviet Union      -0.706***  (0.196) 
Sub-Saharan Africa      -0.794***  (0.239) 
Central/Latin America      -0.692***  (0.190) 
Anglo-Saxon -0.216**  (0.097)     
United States  0.366***  (0.116)     
Italy  -1.331*** (0.129) -1.516*** (0.122) 
Constant  1.011***  (0.304) 0.742* (0.393) 
R-squared 0.856  0.865 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not 
free omitted); Size of government, Sound money; GDP per capita, GDP growth, Inflation, Left-wing and 
Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential 
omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa (Europe omitted).  
 
B. Solidarity Electoral Action 
(AWSP) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
EF:  Regulation  0.235*** (0.083) 0.245*** (0.083) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  -0.186*** (0.045) -0.199*** (0.046) 
Former  Soviet  Union  0.990*** (0.371) 1.136*** (0.392) 
United  States  -0.567*** (0.185) -0.545*** (0.184) 
Italy  1.760*** (0.299) 1.830*** (0.295) 
Constant  -3.477*** (0.592) -3.516*** (0.591) 
R-squared 0.509  0.513 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom (linear and squared); Fraction years free and Partially free 
(Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Foreign trade; GDP per 
capita; Gini Index; Inflation, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing 
government omitted); Weak presidential and Parliamentary electoral system (strong presidential omitted); 
Central/Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Latin 
America, Anglo-Saxon, (Europe omitted).    28
 
C. Union of Freedom (UW)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  -0.096***  (0.037)     
Fraction Years Partially Free  0.751***  (0.285)  0.674***  (0.269) 
EF:  Regulation  0.366*** (0.078) 0.334*** (0.077) 
GDP  per  capita  0.015*  (0.009) 0.018** (0.009) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed      0.370***  (0.116) 
Gov.: Left wing      0.334***  (0.116) 
Gov.: authoritarian      0.734**  (0.351) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious      0.542**  (0.242) 
Parliamentary     -0.304**  (0.128) 
South East Asia      0.400*  (0.235) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.702*** (0.135) -0.616*** (0.131) 
United  States  -1.043*** (0.127) -1.310*** (0.180) 
Constant  -3.840*** (0.405) -4.503*** (0.431) 
R-squared 0.747  0.793 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom squared; Fraction years free (Fraction years not free 
omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Foreign trade; Gini Index; GDP growth, 
Inflation, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government 
omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet 
Union, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Latin America, Italy (Europe omitted).  
 
D. Law and Justice (PiS)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  0.004*  (0.002)     
EF: Foreign Trade  0.200***  (0.071)     
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)      0.022***  (0.006) 
Gini  Index  0.025*** (0.008) 0.024*** (0.008) 
Gov.:  Centrist  or  mixed  -0.300*** (0.122) -0.310*** (0.124) 
Gov.:  Left  wing  -0.313*** (0.120) -0.344*** (0.107) 
Gov.:  ethnic/religious  -0.772*** (0.269) -0.825*** (0.257) 
Parliamentary -0.226**  (0.104)     
South East Asia  -0.449*  (0.271)  -0.661**  (0.273) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.204***  (0.373)  -0.946**  (0.409) 
Central/Latin  America  -1.270*** (0.279) -1.097*** (0.311) 
Constant  -3.963*** (0.627) -2.664*** (0.312) 
R-squared 0.705  0.698 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not 
free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Regulation; GDP growth, Inflation, 
Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential 
omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Anglo-Saxon, United States, 
Italy (Europe omitted).    29
 
E. Citizens’ Platform (PO)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom      -0.555***  (0.143) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared      0.043***  (0.013) 
Fraction Years Partially Free    0.597*  (0.339) 
EF:  Size  of  Government  -0.089*** (0.028) -0.076*** (0.021) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights      0.064*  (0.037) 
EF: Regulation  0.083**  (0.043)     
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.060** (0.027) 0.068** (0.028) 
Inflation [%]      0.018***  (0.007) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed  0.468***  (0.092)  0.555***  (0.085) 
Gov.: Left wing  0.457***  (0.102)  0.424***  (0.087) 
Gov.: authoritarian      -0.710*  (0.427) 
Weak presidential      0.930**  (0.396) 
Former Soviet Union      -0.633**  (0.317) 
South East Asia      -0.696**  (0.296) 
Middle East/North Africa      -0.622*  (0.362) 
Central/Latin  America  0.619*** (0.231) 0.678*** (0.257) 
Constant -2.212***  (0.316)  -1.118**  (0.492) 
R-squared 0.457  0.561 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free (Fraction years not free omitted); 
Sound money, Foreign trade; GDP per capita; Gini Index; Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government 
omitted); Parliamentary electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Anglo-Saxon, United States, Italy (Europe omitted).  
 
F. League of Polish Families 
(LPR) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Fraction  Years  Free  2.009*** (0.389) 1.702*** (0.394) 
EF:  Regulation  0.482*** (0.083) 0.373*** (0.123) 
GDP Growth [%]      -0.095**  (0.048) 
Gov.:  Centrist  or  mixed  -1.148*** (0.188) -1.383*** (0.225) 
Gov.: Left wing      -0.370*  (0.205) 
Gov.:  ethnic/religious  -2.179*** (0.532) -2.448*** (0.584) 
Parliamentary     0.565***  (0.221) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  1.523*** (0.317) 1.340*** (0.294) 
Former  Soviet  Union  3.709*** (0.500) 4.247*** (0.559) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.968*  (0.595)     
United States      0.671**  (0.295) 
Constant  -6.801*** (0.557) -5.807*** (0.783) 
R-squared 0.732  0.756 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom (linear and squared); Fraction years partially free (Fraction 
years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Foreign trade; GDP per capita; 
Gini Index; Inflation, Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral 
system (strong presidential omitted); South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Central/Latin America, Anglo-
Saxon, Italy (Europe omitted).  
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G. Others  Civil Liberties Political  Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared      0.009***  (0.004) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.211**  (0.091)     
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)  -0.058***  (0.018)  -0.045***  (0.012) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed  -0.292*  (0.157)  -0.321**  (0.158) 
South  East  Asia  -1.212*** (0.413) -1.064*** (0.414) 
Anglo-Saxon -0.553***  (0.186)  -0.398**  (0.178) 
United  States  1.029*** (0.233) 0.923*** (0.209) 
Constant  -3.654*** (0.447) -3.079*** (0.251) 
R-squared 0.343  0.349 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not 
free omitted); Size of government, Sound money, Foreign trade, Regulation; Gini Index; GDP growth, Inflation, 
Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential and 
Parliamentary electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, Middle 
East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Latin America, Italy (Europe omitted).  
 
Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
χ
2(21) =77.13***  χ
2(21) = 80.51*** 
Notes: Number of observations is 66. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are applied using the 
total number of votes per country. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy also include those from the 
Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breush-Pagan test of 
independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the equations 
in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR 
is justified. 
 
The key question of interest, however, is which variables survive the testing down procedure and 
what does that tell us about the validity of the three hypotheses formulated in the preceding 
section. The evidence is least favorable for the skill-based self-selection hypothesis, which posits 
that host-country income inequality is correlated with migrants’ skills: highly skilled migrants 
choose high-inequality destinations, while those with low skills prefer more egalitarian societies. 
To test this motive for migration, the Gini coefficient was included among explanatory variables. 
However, the general-to-specific procedure eliminated it completely from the regressions with 
Czech migrant votes. In the Polish regressions, income inequality survived the testing-down and 
is correlated with votes for the SLD-UP (coalition of the Party of Democratic Left and the Union 
of Labor) and the PiS (Law and Justice) parties only. The skill-based self-selection hypothesis 
predicts that votes for right wing parties are positively correlated with income inequality while 
those for left-wing parties display a negative correlation. This prediction is confirmed for the PiS 
which, being a right-wing party, indeed derives greater support from countries with high income 
inequality. The votes for the SLD, however, are also positively correlated with income inequality   31
(in the regression with political rights), contrary to the hypothesis. For all the remaining parties, 
the indicator of income inequality was eliminated by the testing-down procedure.  
Tables 3 and 4 also reveal that several of the regional dummy variables survive to the end, thus 
potentially indicating support for the political self-selection hypothesis. This hypothesis 
stipulates that support for left-wing and post-communist parties should be greater, and support 
for right wing parties lower, in the former communist countries. The opposite should hold for 
Western democracies i.e. support for left-wing parties should be lower compared to support for 
right-wing parties. The evidence, however, is at best mixed. While many regional dummy 
variables are eliminated by the general-to-specific procedure, when they do remain, they 
frequently appear with the wrong sign. In particular, the support for the KSCM (Czech 
Communist Party) is not any higher in the former communist countries than in Western Europe 
or in Anglo-Saxon countries (in fact, the only regional variable that survives the testing down for 
the Communists is the dummy for Italy where is appears with a negative coefficient). In addition, 
the CSSD (Czech Social Democrats), contrary to the political self-selection hypothesis, draws 
significantly fewer votes from Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Similarly, 
the Polish SLD-UP fared poorly in the former Soviet Union, whereas it fared well in the US. The 
results are similarly mixed for right-wing parties. Among Czech parties, the ODS (Civic 
Democratic Party) draws lower support in Central/Eastern Europe, as predicted by the 
hypothesis, but the opposite is true for the KDU-US (coalition of Christian Democrats and Union 
of Freedom). Among Polish migrant voters, the AWSP (Solidarity Electoral Action) fared well 
in the former Soviet Union despite its deep anti-communist roots – and poorly in the US. The 
support for the UW (Union of Freedom) is low in the Anglo-Saxon countries and especially in 
the US, despite its liberal pro-market nature. Only the PO (Citizens’ Platform) received fewer 
votes from the former Soviet Union, as predicted by the hypothesis. Surprisingly, the support for 
the LPR (extreme-right League of Polish Families) is high in Central/Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union and also in the US.  
In contrast to the two self-selection hypotheses, the evidence with respect to the adaptive 
learning hypothesis is more encouraging. We account both for the extent of democracy 
(measured with the Freedom House indexes of civil liberties and political rights) and the 
tradition of democracy (measured as the fraction of years between 1972 and 2001 that the 
country was classified by the Freedom House as free or partially free) in the host countries. The   32
latter may be important as it distinguishes countries that democratized recently from those that 
espoused high degrees of democracy for decades. Striking similarities appear both across parties, 
and across the two countries included in our analysis. On the one hand, the effect of democracy 
on migrant votes is mixed: it is positively significant and hump shaped for every Czech political 
party, (with the maximum effect attained at an intermediate level of democracy), apart from the 
KDU-US
19, for either one or both of the civil liberties/political rights indexes, while in the Polish 
regressions, high levels of democracy are positively related to votes for the AWSP, PiS and LPR 
and negatively related to votes for SLD-UP, UW and U-shaped for the PO. However, the impact 
of the tradition of democracy is quite consistent: countries with a longer tradition of full or 
moderate democracy show less support for the left wing parties – CSSD and KSCM – and 
stronger support for the right wing parties – KDU-US, UW, PO and, somewhat surprisingly 
(given its extremist nature), also LPR.  
The results obtained with the various sub-indexes of economic freedom are mixed but again with 
some consistencies. Most notably, migrants in countries with less pervasive regulation are more 
likely to vote in favor of right-wing parties – ODS, KDU-US, AWSP, UW, PO and LPR than 
left-wing parties – CSSD, KSCM and SLD-UP. The estimated effects of the other sub-indexes 
are more mixed, often with one or two sub-indexes appearing significant and with signs opposite 
to that of regulation.
20 Due to this, the joint impact of economic freedom is in fact weaker than it 
would appear if only the regulation sub-index was included. Nonetheless, comparing the sizes of 
the estimated coefficients for the various sub-indexes, the impact of economic freedom appears 
clearly positive for the KDU-US, AWSP, UW and LPR, and negative for SLD-UP.
21  
The impact of economic development (measured by the GDP per capita) is similar to that of 
economic freedom: migrants in richer and more advanced countries show greater support for 
right-wing parties, KDU-US, UW and PiS, at the expense of left-wing parties, CSSD and 
KSCM. This pattern, however, appears somewhat less robust as it is only obtained for a subset of 
                                                 
19 For KDU-US, the pattern appears U-shaped, however, with the minimum attained at the political rights 
index equal to 0.05. As the index ranges between 0 and 10, the impact of political rights on votes for this party is 
effectively positive.  
20 The various sub-indexes of economic freedom are moderately strongly correlated with each other 
(correlation coefficients between 0.51 and 0.66), with the exception of the size of government, which is essentially 
uncorrelated with the other sub-indexes (correlation coefficients range between –0.32 and 0.20), see table C1 in the 
Appendix. 
21 As for these parties, either regulation is the only sub-index that remains significant after performing the 
general-to-specific procedure, or it dominates, in absolute value, the coefficients obtained for the other sub-indexes.    33
parties. In contrast to economic development, the results for economic performance (economic 
growth and inflation), while appearing significant for some parties, are mixed and do not 
conform to a clear-cut pattern across parties and the two countries. Czech migrants in high-
inflation countries show greater support for left-wing parties, CSSD and KSCM, than for ODS, 
but this pattern is not replicated in the Polish data. The weak and mixed results for economic 
performance variables should not come as surprising though. Typically, the literature on 
economic voting finds that voters punish the government for bad economic performance by 
voting for the opposition and reward it for good performance by reelecting it. However, the host 
country’s economic conditions have little relevance for passing a verdict on the competence of 
the government in the migrants’ home country.  
Similarly, variables reflecting the nature of the political environment in the host country – 
political orientation of the government and the type of political system (parliamentary, strong 
presidential or weak presidential) frequently appear significant but it is difficult to identify a 
systematic pattern in the results. Sometimes, the results defy expectations. For example, the 
KDU-US, UW and PO, being all right-of-center parties, do well among migrants who live in 
countries with left-wing governments, whereas the CSSD does poorly in such countries. For 
other parties, the pattern is more as expected: the UW also does well in countries with a centrist 
or mixed government, while the PiS and LPR do poorly in countries with either centrist/mixed or 
left-wing government. Therefore, while political environment seems to have an effect on 
migrants’ political preferences, the precise nature of this effect is not very clear.
22 Overall, the 
results provide more consistent support for the adaptive learning hypothesis than either the 
political or economic self-selection hypotheses, suggesting that migrants’ political attitudes and 
behavior are indeed influenced by their new environment.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the voting behavior of Czech and Polish migrants who participated in their 
countries’ most recent national elections by casting their votes from abroad. Evidence from these 
                                                 
22 Note that finding a strong impact of the political orientation of the host country’s government on migrant 
voting behavior could be interpreted also as evidence in favor of the political self-selection hypothesis. One would 
need information of the migrants voting histories to differentiate between political self-selection and adaptive 
learning. Given that the results are mixed, this problem does not arise in our case though.    34
elections indicates that the voting behavior of migrants differs substantially from those cast by 
their compatriots back home. Moreover, the preferences of migrants vary considerably across the 
various host countries. In this paper we consider three alternative hypotheses that could 
potentially explain these differences: the adaptive learning hypothesis (i.e. migrants gradually 
adopt the norms and values prevailing in the host country and this influences their voting 
political preferences accordingly), the economically-based self-selection hypothesis (migrants 
move to countries where the payoff to their human capital is highest), and finally the political 
self-selection hypothesis (migrants choose destination countries based on  their pre-migration 
political attitudes).  
The analysis is comprised of a wide range of potential determinants of migrant voting behavior, 
motivated by the three alternative hypotheses. To determine which factors robustly affect voting 
from abroad, the general to specific methodology is applied to the long list of potential 
explanatory variables. This method reduces the general unrestricted model to a more 
parsimonious one, containing only significant variables. The results of the slimmed-down model 
provide only little support for the self-selection hypotheses which stipulate that differences in 
migrants’ political preferences are driven by self-selection of migrants – whether on economic or 
political grounds. In contrast, the results give strong indications that migrants’ voting behavior is 
indeed shaped by the institutional environment prevailing in the host country. In particular, right-
wing parties tend to fare well, and left-wing parties do poorly, among migrants living in 
countries with a long tradition of full or partial democracy and/or a greater extent of economic 
freedom. Similarly, right-wing parties derive more support from migrants living in economically 
advanced countries, while the opposite holds true for left-wing parties. The results, however, are 
more mixed and less clear-cut in regards the impact of economic performance (growth and 
inflation) and the political environment (i.e. political orientation of the incumbent government, 
and whether the political system is presidential or weakly/strongly presidential) on migrant 
voting behavior. While these variable appear significant in regressions for some parties, there 
does not appear to be a systematic pattern across the different parties.  
These findings further our understanding of how changes in the voters’ institutional environment 
have an important effect on voting behavior. These results suggest that voters tend to adapt to the 
values and norms prevailing in their current surroundings and as these norms change, so too does   35
voting behavior. Migration is an extreme case of such a societal change but a similar process is 
likely to be at play in countries undergoing fundamental economic and political transitions.  
Finally, the results underscore the importance of migration (permanent or temporary) in 
facilitating political and economic changes in countries that currently are, or recently were, ruled 
by authoritarian and interventionist governments. Migrants can play an important political role, 
as the examples enumerated in footnote 3 illustrate. Even more importantly, returning migrants, 
who have adopted democratic and liberal views, are likely to strengthen the demand for 
democratic institutions and liberal economic policies and join grass-roots support for likewise 
minded parties. Not surprisingly, repressive regimes often curtail their citizens’ freedom to 
travel. Communist countries (whether the former Soviet block or present day Cuba and North 
Korea) are prime examples of this. Turkmenistan – a post-Soviet dictatorial regime in Central 
Asia – went even further: not only does it severely restricts its citizens’ movement across 
borders, but recently, Turkmen nationals who also held Russian passports (and as such were 
relatively free to travel) were forced either to relinquish their Russian nationality or emigrate. 
Furthermore, Turkmen teachers who obtained their education abroad have been prohibited from 
exercising their profession.
23 Clearly, it is not emigration that repressive regimes are concerned 
about; in fact, communist countries would occasionally even force particularly steadfast 
dissenters to emigrate; in this respect, the case of East Germany where the collapse of the regime 
was precipitated by massive emigration is exceptional. Rather, the threat is posed by returning 
migrants who have been exposed to more liberal economic and political norms and may 
therefore pose a threat to the stability of the regime.  
                                                 
23 See RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 73, Part I, 16 April 2003.    36
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
Table A1 Czech Republic: General Unrestricted Model Specification 
A. Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.109  (0.210) 0.417** (0.211) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.001  (0.014)  -0.038**  (0.017) 
Fraction  Years  Free  0.129 (0.645) 0.005 (0.706) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  0.083  (0.582)  -0.329  (0.637) 
EF: Size of Government  0.049  (0.057)  0.072  (0.054) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.077  (0.117)  0.025  (0.117) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.132 (0.110) -0.145 (0.106) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.022 (0.092) 0.003 (0.089) 
EF:  Regulation  0.077 (0.127) 0.113 (0.127) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.024 (0.025) -0.010 (0.024) 
GDP Growth [%]  0.007  (0.031)  -0.002  (0.029) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.002 (0.014) -0.015 (0.015) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.051 (0.163) -0.025 (0.155) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  0.059 (0.192) 0.041 (0.181) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  0.667 (0.552) 0.387 (0.511) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.137 (0.405) -0.276 (0.379) 
Weak presidential
2  -0.140 (0.362) -0.130 (0.349) 
Parliamentary
2  0.154 (0.197) 0.240 (0.193) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.350 (0.411) -0.317 (0.407) 
Former  Soviet  Union  0.110 (0.700) -0.387 (0.680) 
South East Asia  0.666*  (0.374)  0.234  (0.375) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.022 (0.718) -0.390 (0.677) 
Central/Latin  America  -0.247  (0.437) -0.767* (0.452) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.049 (0.204) -0.040 (0.198) 
United  States  -0.089 (0.341) -0.187 (0.332) 
Italy -0.443*  (0.258)  -0.556**  (0.241) 
Constant  -1.903*  (1.118) -1.164 (1.035) 
R-squared _0.4579  0.4910 
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B. Czech Social Democratic 
Party (CSSD) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.401  (0.329) 0.609* (0.334) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.042*  (0.022) -0.027 (0.026) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -1.519  (1.011) -3.102*** (1.117) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -1.519*  (0.911)  -2.960***  (1.007) 
EF: Size of Government  -0.046  (0.089)  -0.158*  (0.085) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.420**  (0.183)  0.213  (0.185) 
EF: Sound Money  0.208  (0.172)  0.178  (0.168) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.007 (0.143) -0.019 (0.141) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.451**  (0.198) -0.264 (0.201) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.066*  (0.038) -0.058 (0.038) 
GDP Growth [%]  0.008  (0.048)  0.038  (0.047) 
Inflation [%]  0.048**  (0.022)  0.032  (0.024) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.051 (0.256) 0.158 (0.245) 
Gov.: Left wing
1 -0.345  (0.301)  0.053  (0.286) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  1.551*  (0.864) 2.092** (0.808) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1 -0.081  (0.635)  0.553  (0.599) 
Weak presidential
2  0.337 (0.568) 0.264 (0.552) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.282 (0.308) -0.234 (0.305) 
Central/Eastern Europe  -0.981  (0.643) -1.750*** (0.643) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -1.556 (1.096) -0.663 (1.075) 
South  East  Asia  -0.795 (0.585) -0.261 (0.593) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -2.892**  (1.124) -1.178 (1.071) 
Central/Latin  America  0.001 (0.685) 0.596 (0.714) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.134 (0.319) -0.128 (0.312) 
United  States  0.844 (0.534) 0.755 (0.525) 
Italy -1.186***  (0.404)  -0.771**  (0.382) 
Constant  -0.548 (1.750) -1.050 (1.636) 
R-squared 0.5823  0.5999 
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C. Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia (KSCM) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  1.666**  (0.716)  0.173  (0.765) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.124**  (0.048)  0.018  (0.061) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -3.903*  (2.201) -3.193 (2.561) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -5.898***  (1.984)  -4.424*  (2.311) 
EF: Size of Government  0.159  (0.193)  0.020  (0.195) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.828**  (0.400)  0.710*  (0.424) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.387 (0.374) -0.292 (0.385) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.686** (0.313) 0.726** (0.324) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.893**  (0.432) -0.737 (0.461) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.033 (0.084) -0.059 (0.088) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  -0.124 (0.105) -0.123 (0.107) 
Inflation  [%]  0.012 (0.048) 0.026 (0.055) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.195 (0.557) 0.445 (0.562) 
Gov.: Left wing
1 -0.206  (0.655)  0.102  (0.656) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  1.786 (1.882) 1.862 (1.853) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  1.347 (1.383) 1.584 (1.375) 
Weak presidential
2  1.380 (1.236) 1.281 (1.267) 
Parliamentary
2  -1.531** (0.671) -1.714** (0.700) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -1.109 (1.401) -0.588 (1.476) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -3.109 (2.387) -1.097 (2.467) 
South  East  Asia  -1.103 (1.275) -0.046 (1.360) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.113 (2.448) 0.699 (2.457) 
Central/Latin America  -0.824  (1.491)  0.075  (1.639) 
Anglo-Saxon  0.291 (0.695) 0.302 (0.717) 
United  States  0.122 (1.162) 0.033 (1.204) 
Italy  -2.356***  (0.879) -1.684* (0.875) 
Constant  -7.202* (3.813) -6.681* (3.754) 
R-squared 0.6192  05954 
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D. Coalition (KDU-US)  Civil Liberties Political  Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.076 (0.243) -0.300 (0.244) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.008 (0.016) 0.014 (0.019) 
Fraction  Years  Free  0.783  (0.747) 1.756** (0.817) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  0.371  (0.673)  1.200  (0.737) 
EF:  Size  of  Government  -0.095 (0.066) -0.060 (0.062) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  -0.440*** (0.136) -0.378*** (0.135) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.109 (0.127) -0.075 (0.123) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  -0.082 (0.106) -0.038 (0.103) 
EF:  Regulation  0.603*** (0.146) 0.528*** (0.147) 
GDP  per  capita  0.086*** (0.028) 0.075*** (0.028) 
GDP Growth [%]  0.015  (0.036)  0.003  (0.034) 
Inflation [%]  -0.008  (0.016)  0.002  (0.018) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.071 (0.189) 0.068 (0.179) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  0.332 (0.222) 0.209 (0.209) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  0.884 (0.638) 0.724 (0.591) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  0.439 (0.469) 0.220 (0.438) 
Weak presidential
2  0.570 (0.419) 0.537 (0.404) 
Parliamentary
2  0.582** (0.227) 0.513** (0.223) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.481  (0.475) 0.947** (0.470) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -0.134 (0.810) -0.354 (0.786) 
South  East  Asia  -0.396 (0.433) -0.532 (0.433) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -0.155 (0.830) -0.847 (0.783) 
Central/Latin  America  0.351 (0.506) 0.141 (0.522) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.158 (0.236) -0.141 (0.228) 
United  States  0.013 (0.394) 0.048 (0.384) 
Italy  1.522*** (0.298) 1.415*** (0.279) 
Constant  -2.087  (1.293) -1.995* (1.197) 
R-squared 0.8007  0.8130 
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E. Others  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.749**  (0.301) -0.207 (0.323) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.036*  (0.020)  0.032  (0.026) 
Fraction Years Free  -2.832***  (0.926)  -2.165**  (1.082) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -1.227  (0.835)  0.335  (0.976) 
EF: Size of Government  0.079  (0.081)  0.089  (0.082) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.153  (0.168)  0.308*  (0.179) 
EF: Sound Money  -0.374**  (0.157)  -0.351**  (0.162) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  -0.116 (0.132) -0.181 (0.137) 
EF:  Regulation  0.354* (0.182) 0.329* (0.195) 
GDP  per  capita  0.024 (0.035) 0.024 (0.037) 
GDP Growth [%]  0.004  (0.044)  -0.020  (0.045) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.085*** (0.020) -0.071*** (0.023) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -0.804*** (0.234) -0.818*** (0.238) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.282  (0.276) -0.487* (0.277) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -2.000**  (0.792) -2.563*** (0.783) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.122 (0.582) -0.561 (0.581) 
Weak presidential
2  -0.699 (0.520) -0.493 (0.535) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.124 (0.282) -0.146 (0.296) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.963 (0.589) -0.478 (0.623) 
Former  Soviet  Union  1.098 (1.005) 1.614 (1.042) 
South  East  Asia  0.754  (0.537) 0.971* (0.574) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  3.743*** (1.030) 2.892*** (1.038) 
Central/Latin  America  0.085 (0.627) 0.316 (0.692) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.411 (0.292) -0.480 (0.303) 
United  States  -1.011** (0.489) -0.997** (0.509) 
Italy  -0.068 (0.370) -0.050 (0.370) 
Constant  -2.884*  (1.604) -1.714 (1.586) 
R-squared 05774  0.5473 
 
Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
χ
2(10) = 42.58***  χ
2(10) = 41.67*** 
Notes: Number of observations is 54. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are applied using the 
total number of votes per country. Omitted variables include: fraction of years not free, right wing government, 
strong presidential system and Western Europe. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy also include 
those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breush-Pagan test 
of independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the 
equations in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the 
choice of SUR is justified. 
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Table A2 Poland: General Unrestricted Model Specification 
A. Coalition of Democratic Left 
and Union of Labor (SLD-UP) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  0.376*  (0.192)  0.076  (0.172) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.027**  (0.012) -0.006 (0.014) 
Fraction Years Free  -0.582  (0.637)  0.120  (0.737) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -0.899*  (0.494)  -0.391  (0.559) 
EF:  Size  of  Government  -0.003 (0.043) -0.011 (0.044) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  -0.091  (0.072)  -0.133*  (0.070) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.037 (0.064) -0.021 (0.066) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.073 (0.081) 0.121 (0.080) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.266*** (0.088) -0.272*** (0.093) 
GDP  per  capita  0.005 (0.015) -0.001 (0.015) 
Gini  Index  0.013 (0.009) 0.015 (0.010) 
GDP Growth [%]  0.006  (0.028)  -0.004  (0.030) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.005 (0.009) -0.009 (0.010) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1 0.273**  (0.114)  0.306***  (0.115) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.058 (0.121) -0.013 (0.121) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  0.309 (0.406) 0.410 (0.414) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  0.875*** (0.308) 0.815*** (0.304) 
Weak presidential
2  0.140 (0.388) 0.107 (0.392) 
Parliamentary
2 0.298**  (0.152)  0.263  (0.167) 
Central/Eastern Europe  -0.267  (0.384)  0.119  (0.424) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -0.505 (0.499) -0.179 (0.516) 
South  East  Asia  0.197 (0.316) 0.228 (0.326) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.362 (0.438) 0.363 (0.452) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.403 (0.423) -0.370 (0.446) 
Central/Latin  America  -0.380 (0.347) -0.419 (0.359) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.258 (0.162) -0.241 (0.164) 
United  States  0.230 (0.221) 0.192 (0.230) 
Italy  -1.515*** (0.187) -1.483*** (0.196) 
Constant -0.164  (0.970)  0.245  (0.954) 
R-squared 0.8912  0.8830 
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B. Solidarity Electoral Action 
(AWSP) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.356 (0.410) -0.254 (0.360) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.012 (0.026) 0.025 (0.029) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -0.176 (1.360) -0.748 (1.540) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  -0.264 (1.055) -0.200 (1.168) 
EF: Size of Government  0.001  (0.093)  -0.040  (0.092) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  -0.152 (0.153) -0.215 (0.147) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.104 (0.137) -0.076 (0.137) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.075 (0.173) 0.121 (0.168) 
EF: Regulation  0.353*  (0.188)  0.246  (0.195) 
GDP  per  capita  0.074** (0.031) 0.063** (0.032) 
Gini  Index  0.026 (0.020) 0.029 (0.020) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  -0.283*** (0.059) -0.252*** (0.062) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.030 (0.020) -0.019 (0.021) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1 -0.217  (0.244)  0.016  (0.239) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.245 (0.257) -0.049 (0.252) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.968 (0.867) -0.501 (0.865) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.672 (0.658) -0.240 (0.635) 
Weak presidential
2  0.370 (0.828) -0.003 (0.819) 
Parliamentary
2  0.519 (0.325) 0.316 (0.349) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.948 (0.820) 0.430 (0.885) 
Former  Soviet  Union  2.470** (1.065) 2.153** (1.078) 
South  East  Asia  -0.371 (0.674) -0.142 (0.681) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.840 (0.935) 0.995 (0.944) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.327 (0.903) -0.101 (0.931) 
Central/Latin  America  0.606 (0.741) 0.413 (0.750) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.235 (0.346) -0.009 (0.343) 
United  States  -0.721 (0.473) -0.748 (0.479) 
Italy  1.518*** (0.398) 1.599*** (0.409) 
Constant  -2.791  (2.069) -3.507* (1.993) 
R-squared 0.6616  0.6052 
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C. Union of Freedom (UW)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  -0.214  (0.253)  0.138  (0.218) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.012 (0.016) -0.015 (0.018) 
Fraction  Years  Free  0.452 (0.838) 0.020 (0.935) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  0.885  (0.650)  0.328  (0.709) 
EF:  Size  of  Government  -0.040 (0.057) -0.050 (0.056) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.071  (0.094)  0.035  (0.089) 
EF: Sound Money  0.112  (0.084)  0.118  (0.083) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  -0.077 (0.107) -0.069 (0.102) 
EF:  Regulation  0.231** (0.116) 0.251** (0.119) 
GDP  per  capita  0.024 (0.019) 0.028 (0.019) 
Gini  Index  0.018 (0.012) 0.019 (0.012) 
GDP Growth [%]  0.035  (0.036)  0.031  (0.038) 
Inflation  [%]  0.009 (0.012) 0.007 (0.013) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.472*** (0.151) 0.454*** (0.145) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  0.274* (0.159) 0.265* (0.153) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  0.740 (0.535) 0.779 (0.525) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  0.539  (0.405) 0.716* (0.385) 
Weak presidential
2  0.019 (0.510) -0.012 (0.497) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.381*  (0.200) -0.303 (0.212) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.649 (0.506) 0.441 (0.537) 
Former  Soviet  Union  0.268 (0.656) 0.045 (0.654) 
South  East  Asia  0.660 (0.415) 0.638 (0.413) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -0.142 (0.577) -0.058 (0.573) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.436 (0.556) 0.409 (0.565) 
Central/Latin  America  0.063 (0.457) -0.012 (0.455) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.594*** (0.213) -0.593*** (0.208) 
United  States  -1.428*** (0.291) -1.397*** (0.291) 
Italy  -0.120 (0.246) -0.152 (0.248) 
Constant  -4.944*** (1.276) -5.476*** (1.210) 
R-squared 0.8232  0.8234 
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D. Law and Justice (PiS)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.455 (0.278) -0.227 (0.242) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  0.029*  (0.017)  0.023  (0.020) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -0.227 (0.921) -1.133 (1.038) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  0.623  (0.714)  0.274  (0.787) 
EF: Size of Government  0.076  (0.063)  0.074  (0.062) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.049  (0.104)  0.093  (0.099) 
EF: Sound Money  0.030  (0.093)  0.016  (0.092) 
EF: Foreign Trade  0.210*  (0.117)  0.164  (0.113) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.127 (0.127) -0.165 (0.132) 
GDP  per  capita  0.022 (0.021) 0.024 (0.022) 
Gini  Index  0.022 (0.013) 0.020 (0.013) 
GDP Growth [%]  -0.085**  (0.040)  -0.061  (0.042) 
Inflation  [%]  0.001 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -0.296*  (0.165) -0.241 (0.161) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.359** (0.174) -0.335** (0.170) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.703 (0.587) -0.662 (0.583) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -1.444*** (0.445) -1.294*** (0.427) 
Weak presidential
2  -0.128 (0.560) -0.206 (0.552) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.431** (0.220) -0.500** (0.235) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.103 (0.555) -0.478 (0.596) 
Former  Soviet  Union  0.048 (0.721) -0.369 (0.726) 
South  East  Asia  -0.801*  (0.456) -0.747 (0.459) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -0.770 (0.633) -0.755 (0.636) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -1.452**  (0.611) -1.647*** (0.627) 
Central/Latin  America  -1.552*** (0.502) -1.546*** (0.505) 
Anglo-Saxon  0.099 (0.234) 0.162 (0.231) 
United  States  -0.454 (0.320) -0.437 (0.323) 
Italy  0.061 (0.270) 0.073 (0.276) 
Constant  -1.978  (1.401) -2.427* (1.342) 
R-squared 0.7652  0.7607 
   48
 
E. Citizens’ Platform (PO)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  0.130  (0.240)  -0.419**  (0.201) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.009  (0.015) 0.034** (0.016) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -1.482*  (0.796) -0.400 (0.862) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -0.831  (0.617)  0.300  (0.653) 
EF:  Size  of  Government  -0.076 (0.054) -0.062 (0.052) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.089  (0.090)  0.134  (0.082) 
EF: Sound Money  0.079  (0.080)  0.087  (0.077) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  -0.027 (0.102) -0.020 (0.094) 
EF: Regulation  0.195*  (0.110)  0.123  (0.109) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.009 (0.018) -0.022 (0.018) 
Gini  Index  -0.007 (0.012) -0.008 (0.011) 
GDP Growth [%]  0.072**  (0.035)  0.092***  (0.035) 
Inflation [%]  0.024**  (0.012)  0.031***  (0.012) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.508*** (0.143) 0.571*** (0.134) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  0.563*** (0.151) 0.586*** (0.141) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.419 (0.508) -0.486 (0.484) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  0.535 (0.385) 0.291 (0.355) 
Weak presidential
2  0.647 (0.484) 0.601 (0.459) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.169  (0.190) -0.323* (0.195) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.653 (0.480) -0.171 (0.495) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -1.447**  (0.623) -1.005* (0.603) 
South  East  Asia  -0.658*  (0.394) -0.564 (0.381) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -0.763 (0.547) -0.867 (0.529) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.206 (0.528) -0.133 (0.521) 
Central/Latin  America  0.307 (0.434) 0.437 (0.420) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.058 (0.202) -0.032 (0.192) 
United  States  -0.207 (0.277) -0.236 (0.268) 
Italy  0.215 (0.233) 0.238 (0.229) 
Constant  -2.818** (1.211) -2.432** (1.115) 
R-squared 0.6034  0.6266 
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F. League of Polish Families 
(LPR) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.664 (0.518) -0.349 (0.452) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.036 (0.033) 0.025 (0.037) 
Fraction Years Free  3.534**  (1.717)  3.030  (1.935) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  1.587  (1.332)  1.399  (1.467) 
EF: Size of Government  0.064  (0.117)  0.049  (0.116) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  -0.145 (0.193) -0.154 (0.185) 
EF: Sound Money  -0.284*  (0.173)  -0.268  (0.172) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.078 (0.219) 0.080 (0.211) 
EF: Regulation  0.406*  0.237)  0.327  (0.245) 
GDP  per  capita  0.006 (0.039) 0.000 (0.040) 
Gini  Index  -0.011 (0.025) -0.009 (0.025) 
GDP Growth [%]  -0.173**  (0.075)  -0.139*  (0.078) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.038 (0.025) -0.027 (0.027) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -1.587*** (0.309) -1.474*** (0.301) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.453 (0.325) -0.388 (0.317) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.846 (1.095) -0.707 (1.087) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -3.018*** (0.830) -2.723*** (0.797) 
Weak presidential
2  1.114 (1.045) 0.878 (1.030) 
Parliamentary
2  0.880**  (0.410) 0.790* (0.439) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  1.600 (1.036) 1.169 (1.112) 
Former  Soviet  Union  4.309*** (1.345) 3.966*** (1.354) 
South  East  Asia  -1.535*  (0.851) -1.401 (0.855) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.333 (1.181) 0.437 (1.187) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -1.007 (1.140) -1.210 (1.169) 
Central/Latin  America  -0.267 (0.935) -0.322 (0.943) 
Anglo-Saxon  0.087 (0.437) 0.204 (0.432) 
United  States  0.826 (0.597) 0.863 (0.602) 
Italy  -0.280 (0.503) -0.294 (0.514) 
Constant  -1.436 (2.613) -2.535 (2.504) 
R-squared 0.8070  0.8033 
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G. Others  Civil Liberties Political  Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.488 (0.382) -0.018 (0.344) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.046*  (0.024)  0.014  (0.028) 
Fraction Years Free  -0.103  (1.266)  0.002  (1.473) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  -1.283 (0.982) -0.425 (1.117) 
EF: Size of Government  0.138  (0.086)  0.074  (0.088) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.356**  (0.143)  0.221  (0.141) 
EF: Sound Money  -0.332***  (0.127)  -0.287**  (0.131) 
EF: Foreign Trade  -0.031  (0.162)  0.091  (0.160) 
EF:  Regulation  0.088 (0.175) -0.028 (0.187) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.066**  (0.029) -0.085*** (0.031) 
Gini Index  -0.052***  (0.018)  -0.046**  (0.019) 
GDP Growth [%]  0.008  (0.055)  0.018  (0.059) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.024 (0.019) -0.019 (0.020) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1 -0.795***  (0.227)  -0.449**  (0.229) 
Gov.: Left wing
1 -0.259  (0.240)  0.083  (0.241) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1 -0.569  (0.808)  0.250  (0.827) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.495 (0.612) -0.099 (0.607) 
Weak presidential
2  0.800 (0.771) 0.351 (0.784) 
Parliamentary
2  0.393 (0.303) 0.063 (0.334) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.759 (0.764) -0.911 (0.847) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -0.657 (0.991) -0.558 (1.031) 
South  East  Asia  -1.443**  (0.627) -1.135* (0.651) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.263 (0.871) 0.418 (0.903) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  1.013 (0.841) 0.451 (0.890) 
Central/Latin America  1.231*  (0.690)  0.902  (0.718) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.729**  (0.322) -0.419 (0.329) 
United  States  1.658*** (0.440) 1.521*** (0.459) 
Italy  0.067 (0.371) 0.279 (0.391) 
Constant  -1.571 (1.927) -1.131 (1.906) 
R-squared 0.5326  0.4921 
 
Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
χ
2(21) =85.20***  χ
2(21) = 86.66*** 
Notes: Number of observations is 66. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are applied using the 
total number of votes per country. Omitted variables include: fraction of years not free, right wing government, 
strong presidential system and Western Europe. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy also include 
those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breush-Pagan test 
of independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the 
equations in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the 
choice of SUR is justified. 
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Appendix B: List of Explanatory Variables: 
 
Measures of Democracy 
•  Freedom House Democracy Index: The average of 2001 indicators of political freedom and civil liberties 
as reported by Freedom House, rescaled so that it ranges from 0 (no democracy) to 10 (full democracy).  
•  Sub-Indexes of Freedom House Democracy 
-  Civil Liberties 
-  Political Rights 
•  Duration of Democracy: Fraction of years between 1972 and 2001 in which the country is considered free, 
partially free, and not free, as reported by Freedom House. 
•  Democracy Dummies: Dummies included to measure whether the country is free, not free or partially free, 
where free is the omitted category, as reported by Freedom House. 
•  Polity Democracy Index: Computed by subtracting AUTOC (general closedness of political institutions) 
from DEMOC (general openness of political institutions), so that the resulting variable ranges from –10 
(high autocracy) to 10 (high democracy), as reported by Polity IV Project Dataset. 
 
Measures of Political Environment 
•  Political orientation of the current government: Coded as 1. Right-wing, 2. Centrist/mixed, 3. Left-wing, 
4. Authoritarian and 5. Ethnic/Religious, right wing is omitted category. As reported in Beck, George, 
Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001)’s Database of Political Institutions and updated by the authors using 
information reported on http://www.electionworld.org/index.html.  
•  Political System: Coded as 1. Direct Presidential, 2. Weak Presidential (relatively strong president elected 
by the legislature) and 3. Parliamentary, where direst presidential is the omitted category. As reported in 
Beck, George, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001)’s Database of Political Institutions and updated by the 
authors using information reported on www.electionworld.org/index.html.  
 
Measures of Economic Freedom 
•  Heritage Economic Freedom Index: The 2001 economic freedom index as reported by the Heritage 
Foundation, rescaled so that it ranges between 0 (not free) and 5 (most free).  
•  Fraser Economic Freedom Index: The 2000 economic freedom index as reported by the Fraser Institute, 
which ranges between 0 (not free) and 10 (most free). 
•  Sub-indexes of Fraser Economic Freedom: 
Each of the following indexes are measured on a 10 point scale determining the extent to which each area is 
considered economically free, ranging from 0 (not free) to 10(most free): 
-  Size of Government: Expenditure, Taxes and Enterprise 
-  Legal Structure and Security of Property Right 
-  Access to Sound Money 
-  Freedom to exchange with foreigners 
-  Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business 
 
Measures of Economic Development 
•  GDP per capita: Gross Domestic Product is in per capita terms at purchasing power parity and in 
thousands of current US$ as of 2000, as reported by the World Development Indicators.  
•  GDP Growth: Gross Domestic Product growth is in percent as of 2000, as reported by the World 
Development Indicators.  
•  Inflation: Inflation is the GDP deflator (annual %) in percent, as of 2000, as reported by the World 
Development Indicators.   
•  Gini Coefficient: The gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, taken from Country Indicators for 
Foreign Policy (CIFP) database and the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) in various years. 
 
Distance Measures 
•  Distance: Measures the distance from host country capital to home country capital, measured in kilometers 
by City Distance Tool www.geobytes.com/CityDistancetool.htm.   52
•  Border Dummies: Dummies included for countries which share a border with the Czech Republic and 
Poland. 
 
Additional Dummies Included 
•  Regional dummies: Included for Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, 
South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, Central and Latin America and Anglo-
Saxon Countries, where Western Europe is the omitted category. 
•  Italy Dummy: Included as votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican.  
 
 Table B1: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables: Political Indicators 
 
Sub-Indexes of Freedom House
Democracy Index 2000
1 
Sub-Indexes of Freedom House
Democracy Index 2001
1 
Regions  Overall 
Index 
Civil 
Liberties
Political 
Rights
Overall 
Index 
Civil 
Liberties
Political 
Rights
Fraction 
Years 
Free
2 
Fraction 
Years 
Partially 
Free
2 
Polity 
Democracy 
Index 2001
3 
Polity 
Democracy 
Index 2002
3
Political 
Orientation 
of Gov.
4 
Political 
System
5 
Former Soviet Union  3.90 3.83  3.67  3.70 3.67  3.50  0  0.32 0.30  0.10  3.30 0.20 
  (1.79) (1.37)  (2.46)  (1.77) (1.31)  (2.41)  (0)  0.15  (6.75)  (6.92)  (1.16) (0.63) 
Central and Eastern Europe  7.86 7.38  8.45  7.93 7.50  8.57  0.25  0.22 8.23  8.62  2.43 1.64 
  (1.83) (1.56)  (2.31)  (1.69) (1.42)  (2.25)  (0.16)  0.22  (1.74)  (1.33)  (0.94) (0.74) 
Asia  5.36 5.00  5.48  5.36 5.00  5.48  0.24  0.45 3.00  3.07  3.36 1.14 
  (3.34) (2.77)  (3.89)  (3.34) (2.77)  (3.89)  (0.31)  0.38  (7.45)  (7.36)  (1.50) (0.86) 
North Africa and Middle-East  2.47 2.44  2.11  2.13 2.11  1.89  0.02  0.44 -4.00  -4.08  3.67 0.33 
  (1.68) (1.77)  (1.83)  (1.46) (1.47)  (1.65)  (0.06)  0.33  (4.80)  (4.79)  (0.98) (0.72) 
Sub-Sahara Africa  4.58 4.31  4.45  4.58 4.17  4.72  0.05  0.48 2.36  3.18  3.08 0.33 
  (2.50) (1.94)  (3.28)  (2.43) (2.07)  (3.00)  (0.10)  0.30  (4.88)  (5.12)  (1.16) (0.78) 
Central and South America  7.08 6.67  7.50  7.17 6.67  7.64  0.46  0.37 7.08  7.08  1.83 0.08 
  (2.71) (2.75)  (2.89)  (2.79) (2.84)  (2.97)  (0.29)  0.28  (4.58)  (4.58)  (0.83) (0.29) 
Anglo-Saxon  9.83 9.72  10 9.83 9.72  10  1  0  10  10  1.50 1.67 
  (0.41) (0.68)  (0) (0.41) (0.68)  (0)  (0)  0  (0)  (0)  (0.84) (0.82) 
Western Europe  9.50 9.17  10 9.50 9.17  10  0.97  0.02 9.94  9.94  1.61 1.72 
  (0.71) (1.18)  (0) (0.71) (1.18)  (0)  (0.07)  0.05  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.78) (0.67) 
United States  10 10  10  10 10  10  1  0  10  10  1  0 
Notes:
  The table reports the mean values for each explanatory variable, with the standard deviation in parentheses.  
1 The democracy index is the average of 2000 and 2001 indicators of political freedoms and civil liberties as reported by the Freedom House, rescaled so that it ranges 
from 0 (no democracy) to 10 (full democracy). 
2 Fraction years free (partially free) is a variable that corresponds to the fraction of the years that the country was 
classified as free (partially free) by the Freedom House. 
3The Polity democracy index for 2001 and 2002 ranges from –10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high democracy) 
4Political orientation of the government. 
5 Political system: presidential, weak presidential (relatively strong president elected by the legislature), parliamentary. 
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Table B2: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables: Economic and Inequality Indicators 
 
Sub-Indexes of Fraser Economic Freedom Index 2000
1 
Regions  Overall 
Index 
Size of 
Gov. 
Legal/ 
Property 
Rights 
Sound 
Money 
Foreign 
Trade  Regulation
Heritage 
Economic 
Freedom 
Index 
2000
2 
Heritage 
Economic 
Freedom 
Index 
2001
2 
GDP per 
Capita 
2000
3 
Gini 
Coefficient
4
GDP 
Growth 
2000 [%]
5
Inflation
6 
[%] 
Former Soviet Union  5.50 5.19 5.81 4.53 6.78 5.20 1.35 1.31  4.23 38.84 5.96 35.49 
  (1.57) (1.29) (2.06) (4.35) (0.19) (1.27) (0.49) (0.49)  (2.25) (12.71) (3.14)  (55.03) 
Central and Eastern Europe  6.10 4.85 6.49 6.44 7.02 5.69 1.95 2.05  9.01 30.40 4.69  7.60 
  (0.70) (1.14) (0.74) (1.90) (0.93) (0.54) (0.62) (0.58)  (3.92) (4.12)  (1.75)  (10.81) 
Asia  6.80 6.80 5.73 8.03 7.28 6.17 2.06 2.07  9.78 37.50 5.91  3.30 
  (1.14) (1.35) (1.74) (1.51) (1.52) (1.03) (1.02) (1.02)  (9.71) (8.33)  (2.97)  (4.93) 
North Africa and Middle-East  6.05 5.61 6.11 7.46 5.95 4.96 1.58 1.60  6.94 43.24 3.68 15.13 
  (1.08) (1.26) (1.57) (1.90) (1.34) (1.32) (0.85) (0.89)  (4.88) (10.18) (2.19)  (15.92) 
Sub-Sahara Africa  5.52 5.99 4.42 5.92 6.32 5.25 1.50 1.65  2.01 45.32 2.49 50.23 
  (1.02) (1.04) (1.42) (2.19) (0.57) (1.07) (0.58) (0.39)  (2.42) (8.28)  (3.45) (119.97) 
Central and South America  6.66 7.31 5.09 7.63 7.00 6.25 2.11 2.12  7.73 49.27 3.46  7.72 
  (0.70) (0.93) (1.19) (1.55) (0.72) (0.61) (0.74) (0.73)  (2.22) (8.98)  (2.62)  (7.41) 
Anglo-Saxon  8.21 6.46 9.23 9.40 8.24 7.71 3.14 3.19  26.85  37.19 4.62  3.31 
  (0.21) (0.59) (0.18) (0.26) (0.43) (0.46) (0.10) (0.15)  (4.93) (4.53)  (3.51)  (1.08) 
Western Europe  7.38 4.60 8.43 9.28 8.01 6.57 2.73 2.78  25.67  31.78 4.05  3.02 
  (0.47) (1.24) (1.03) (0.65) (0.74) (0.68) (0.26) (0.27)  (7.28) (4.31)  (1.52)  (3.54) 
United States  8.54 7.57 9.23 9.66  8  8.23  3.2  3.25  34.14 40.8  4.2  2.21 
Notes:
  The table reports the mean values for each explanatory variable, with the standard deviation in parentheses.  
1 The Fraser Economic Freedom Index and sub-indexes are measured on a 10 point scale determining the extent to which each area is considered economically 
free, ranging from 0 (not free) to 10(most free).
 2 The Heritage economic freedom index is the 2002 value of the index, rescaled so that it ranges between 0 (not 
free) and 5 (most free). 
3 Gross national income is in per capita terms and in thousands current US$. 
4 The gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, 
which ranges from 0 (perfect equality) and 100 (perfect inequality). 
5 GDP growth is in percent. 
6 Inflation is in percent.  
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Appendix C: List of Regions and Countries 
Former Soviet Union    Central and Eastern Europe    Western Europe    Middle East and North Africa 
Polish Votes  Czech Votes    Polish Votes Czech Votes    Polish Votes  Czech Votes    Polish Votes  Czech Votes 
Azerbaijan Belarus    Albania  Albania   Austria  Austria    Algeria  Algeria 
Belarus Georgia    Bosnia-All  Bosnia-All    Belgium  Belgium    Egypt  Egypt 
Jordan Kazakhstan    Bulgaria  Bulgaria   Cyprus Cyprus   Iran  Iran 
Kazakhstan Russia    Croatia Croatia   Denmark  Denmark    Iraq  Iraq 
Moldova Ukraine    Czech  Estonia    Finland Finland   Jordan  Kuwait 
Russia Uzbekistan    Estonia  Hungary   France  France    Kuwait  Lebanon 
Ukraine    Hungary  Latvia    Germany  Germany    Lebanon  Libya 
Uzbekistan     Latvia  Lithuania   Greece  Greece    Libya  Morocco 
     Lithuania  Poland    Iceland  Israel  Morocco  Saudi  Arabia 
Asia   Macedonia  Romania    Israel  Italy   Saudi  Arabia  Syria 
Polish Votes  Czech Votes    Romania Slovakia    Italy  Netherlands   Syria  Tunisia 
China China    Slovakia  Slovenia    Luxembourg  Norway   Tunisia Turkey 
Hong Kong  India    Slovenia      Netherlands  Portugal    Turkey  United Arab Emir. 
India Indonesia         Norway  Spain    United Arab Emir. Yemen 
Indonesia Japan          Portugal  Sweden    Yemen  
Japan Korea  South    Latin America   Spain  Switzerland       
Korea North  Malaysia   Polish  Votes Czech  Votes    Sweden     Sub-Sahara Africa 
Korea South  Mongolia    Argentina Argentina    Switzerland     Polish Votes  Czech Votes 
Malaysia Pakistan    Brazil  Brazil         Angola  Congo-Kinshasa 
Singapore Philippines    Chile  Chile    Anglo-Saxon   Congo-Kinshasa  Cote  d'Ivoire 
Taiwan Singapore   Columbia  Columbia    Polish Votes  Czech Votes   Kenya Ethiopia 
Thailand   Thailand    Costa Rica Costa  Rica    Australia  Australia    Madagascar  Ghana 
 Vietnam    Cuba Cuba    Canada  Canada    Nigeria  Kenya 
     Mexico  Mexico    Ireland  Ireland    Senegal  Nigeria 
      Panama  Peru    USA  USA    South Africa  South Africa 
      Peru  Uruguay    United Kingdom United Kingdom   Tanzania  Zimbabwe 
     Uruguay  Venezuela        Zimbabwe   
     Venezuela             
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Table C1 Bivariate Correlations of Fraser Economic Freedom Index and Sub-Indexes 
 
2000 Fraser Index  Economic Freedom  EF: Size of Government EF: Legal/Property Rights  EF: Sound Money EF: Foreign Trade  EF: Regulation 
Economic Freedom   1           
EF: Size of Government  0.22 1       
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.76 -0.32  1       
EF: Sound Money  0.84 0.03  0.60  1     
EF: Foreign Trade  0.76 0.01  0.57  0.51  1   
EF: Regulation  0.85 0.20  0.63  0.56  0.66  1 
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